Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎148r] (295/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
EASTERN (Turkey).
[October 30.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[E 11890/27/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Sir A. Geddes (Washington).
(No. 1602.)
Sir, Foreign Office, October 30, 1922.
THE American Ambassador called upon me this afternoon in order to present to
me the reply of his Government to the invitation which had been extended to them
to participate in some form or other in the forthcoming Peace Conference in Lausanne.
As a matter of fact, the reply of the American Secretary of State was an answer, not to
the formal invitation, which had reached Washington only the day after Mr. Hughes’s
communication had been despatched, but to the informal suggestion which I had made
to the Ambassador in conversation on my own responsibility some weeks ago. In the
aide-memoire which the Ambassador now placed in my hands, the American Govern
ment indicated seven subjects likely to be raised at the conference, in which the
United States would be particularly interested. They went on to say that, in order to
safeguard their interests in this matter and to facilitate the exchange of views, they
would be prepared to send observers to the proposed conference, if this action was
agreeable to the Powers concerned. A sentence was added that, without participating
in the negotiating of the Treaty of Peace, these observers would be able to indicate the
position of the American Government in greater detail, and could also keep the latter
informed of the attitude of the other Powers.
T said that 1 was gratified to learn that, as I had all along hoped, America would
take her share in a settlement which was of far more than local or European concern ;
but I should like to know what exactly the functions of the American observers would
be. Would they be silent participants in the proceedings of the conference, as I had
seen at more than one preceding conference ; or would they take part in the discussions
and express opinions ? If they adopted the latter course, would they be prepared to
sign the treaty that would result from the conference ?
Mr. Harvey said that the American representatives would certainly be fully
empowered to express the views of their Government upon all the important points in
which they were concerned, and that they would not hesitate, if asked, to do so. This,
he thought, would involve their almost continuous presence at the proceedings. As
to the signature of a treaty: in this America could not have a hand, inasmuch as she
had not been at war with Turkey.
When I pointed out, however, that the future regulation of the Straits would
in all probability be the subject of a separate and special convention, to be signed by
other States who had also not been belligerents, the Ambassador thought it not
impossible that, in such a case, American signatures might be appended to such an
agreement.
Before the Ambassador left the room, I told him that I had reported to Washington
the very disquieting remarks that he had made to me on a recent occasion about the
state of feeling alleged to have been produced in America by Lord Balfour’s note.
In reply, I had been assured by your Excellency, after you had taken steps to consult
authoritative opinion, that these views were much exaggerated and did not faithfully
represent the state of opinion as existing in the States at the present time.
Mr. Harvey pointed out that this might very well be the case as regards
Washington and New York, the atmosphere of which was often quite different from
that of America as a whole. But his own experience as a newspaper man brought him
into contact with every shade of opinion in all parts of the American Continent, and,
further, no American Congressman or Senator passed through London without making
his views known to the Embassy. He was therefore sorry to say that he could not
recede from the position he had formerly taken up. Personally, he very much
regretted the despatch of the Balfour note, because he believed it to be quite possible
- and in this he expressed the views of the American President and Secretary of State
as well as his own—to reduce the obligation, which Great Britain had acknowledged
and accepted, to the minimum point that would be compatible with acquiescence by
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