Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎131v] (262/348)

anyone, even from the inside, to follow the kaleidoscopic changes that have taken place
at Tehran. Prime Minister succeeded Prime Minister with almost bewildering rapidity,
and there were during this period almost as many Persian policies as there were I lime
Ministers. One week the policy would he that of abandoning the Anglo-Persian
Agreement, but still keeping in touch with the British, and getting as much out of
them as could be obtained. Another week the policy would be that of breaking
with the British, and inducing Swedes, Frenchmen or Americans to interest themselves
in various aspects of the administration. A third week saw a cringing and terrified
subjection to Soviet threats. The life of eacn Persian Ministry coincided with its
power to bribe its supporters or to keep its opponents in subjection, sometimes even in
prison.
As a result of these vicissitudes, of a widespread propaganda directed to prove
that Persia was bartering her independence, and of the increasing power and influence
of the Soviet forces in the north, the Anglo-Persian Agreement was finally repudiated
by the Persian Government, and was without much reluctance abandoned by the
British Government, who were reluctant to otfer an assistance that was not welcome,
or to accept responsibilities that were daily becoming graver and more irksome.
The Persian Government has since been engaged in the none too easy task of
discovering some new and magnanimous friend who would extricate the country from
its financial embarrassments, and give it the moral support of a not too openly interested
assistance.
(b.) Economically, Persia is in a deplorable condition. Her imports greatly exceed
her exports, and her expenditure enormously exceeds her revenue. So long as the
resources of the country remain undeveloped, the former disadvantage cannot be
remedied ; but it should be possible, with honest and intelligent supervision, provided
there is the requisite force behind it, to bring about serious reforms in the financial
administration. This, however, is a task which can only be achieved by the introduc
tion of foreign advisers with very full powers, loyally supported (as has never hitherto
been the case) by a reasonably stable and competent native administration.
Many efforts in this direction have been made from time to time with varying
success. The Customs were placed under Belgian officials in 1900, and have been
effectively administered by them ever since. The result has been a great increase of
revenue which, for the first time in Persian history, found its way direct to the Persian
Treasury. On the other hand, all attempts to place the Ministry of Finance under the
guidance of a foreign adviser or administrator have met with uniform disaster. The
first of these was made in 1903, when M. Naus, the Belgian Director of Customs, was
placed in charge, but was forced to retire almost immediately. The second attempt
was that of M. Bizot, a French official, who was appointed Financial Adviser in 1907.
His efforts to help the Persians to reform their finances proved entirely abortive, as
they refused to confer on him any executive powers and his advice was systematically
ignored. The third effort in this direction was that of Mr. Morgan Shuster, who was
appointed Treasurer-General in 1911. In spite of the active support of a considerable
body of Persian public opinion, and particularly that of the Persian Parliament,
Mr. Shuster failed because his methods—radical and courageous as they were—brought
him into sharp and inevitable conflict with the Russians.
The final effort was that of Mr. Armitage Smith, a capable official of His Majesty’s
Treasury, who, in pursuance of the terms of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, was sent to
Persia in 1920 to reorganise its finances. He found himself very much in the same
position as Mr. Morgan Shuster had been some years previously. Against him were
arrayed all the forces of selfishness, corruption and intrigue. Mr. Armitage Smith
returned to England a few months later in despair, and so did the various British officers
who, in connection with the agreement, were engaged in assisting Persia to reorganise
her administration.
The confusion that exists in the financial department of the Persian Government
at Tehran is deplorable beyond measure. No serious effort to draw up a budget has
ever been made, and the system in force—if such an expression can be applied to it—
is one that lends itself to every conceivable form of peculation and corruption that
oriental ingenuity can contrive.
As far back as 1900 the Persian Government embarked upon a career of recourse
to foreign loans. From that, date until the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement
of 1907, Persia successfully played off the Imperial Russian Government against
His Majesty’s Government, with the result that she borrowed large sums of money
alternately from Russia and Great Britain.