Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎127r] (253/348)

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C1RCULATPl) TO THE CABINET.
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
EASTERN. [February 2.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[F 1248/5/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).
(No. 344.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, February 2, 1922.
THE French Ambassador came to see me this afternoon and in the course of our
conversation handed me a document of many pages containing, in a formal shape
and drawn up, as he believed, by M. Poincare himself, the observations of the French
Government concerning the modifications which they desire to introduce into the text
of the proposed treaty of guarantee between France and Great Britain. The
substance of this memorandum he had communicated to me before in our various
conversations, but only, as he said, in a personal capacity. He now desired to hand it
in collectively and formally on behalf of his Government.
His Excellency then passed on to renew, in an apologetic vein, his observations
on the recent unfortunate letter of his Government concerning the Graeco-Turkish
situation, which letter I now knew, and he also was aware that I knew, even though
the substance of it might have been sent to him from Paris, had been composed by
himself. While he repeated to me with much reiteration what he had intended to
convey. I had no alternative, but to reply that he had signally failed to convey it, and
that the impression which his letter had produced upon me had been shared by
everyone who had read the document.
I told him. however, that I was much more concerned with w T hat we were going
to do at the conference at Paris than with what had previously been written. I was
aware from a telegram from your Lordship what had passed in the interview
between yourself and M. Poincare, and. indeed, the Count de Saint-Aulaire proceeded
to give me the same information on his own account. I was glad. I said, to learn
that M. Poincare had modified his attitude on many of the important particulars
upon which I had commented; but there remained two important points upon which,
so far, he did not appear to have given your Lordship or myself any satisfaction.
If, as I gathered, M. Poincar£ or the Turks were going to press for the complete
evacuation of Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. by the Greeks, what, I asked, were the guarantees the French
were going to propose for the safety and indeed the lives of the large Greek popula
tion in Smyrna, Aivali, and other towns in the interior. It was out of the question
to trust them to the tender mercy of the Turks. We had ample and reliable evidence
that the Angora Turks had been deporting the Christian populations of Eastern
Anatolia Peninsula that forms most of modern-day Turkey. in large masses to the coast amid every circumstance of cruelty and suffering.
Their policy was indeed admitted by them to be one of deliberate extermination.
Was it the least likely that Europe would stand by to see the Greeks on the Smyrna
coast or in the interior treated in a similar fashion? Was it not absurd to rely upon
the paper guarantees for minorities in the European treaties?
His Excellency admitted that something much more substantial would be wanted
in the present case, though he did not indicate to me clearly where it was to be found.
He thought, however, that complete and immediate evacuation would be found
impossible and that it could only be effected by stages. Meanwhile he placed great
reliance upon the creation of a gendarmerie under Allied officers.
I said I did not believe for one moment that any such body would be able to
prevent massacre if the Turks were bent upon it. and I earnestly urged the French
Government, if their proposals were going to be of the character indicated by
M. Poincare, to address themselves to the case not merely of the Greeks whom they
wished to turn out, but of the Greeks who were going to be left behind.
The second point upon which I said I had so far had no reply from M. Poincar6
was the view of the French Government as to the steps to be taken if an agreement
arrived at between the Powers was absolutely rejected by the Turks.
The Ambassador asked me what I would do in those circumstances, to whicn
I replied that the question was one which I had originally contemplated examining
in concert with the French at Paris, but it was they who had forced the matter to
the front and compelled an earlier examination by laying down that in no
circumstances whatsoever would they apply coercion to the Turks.
His Excellency reiterated that for the French Government to fight the Turks
or move forces against them was out of the question, and I readily allowed that we
were as little anxious or as little likely to take a similar step. But this did not