Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎105r] (209/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government,]
Printed for the Cabinet. December 1921.
CONFIDENTIAL
THERE have been three main phases of the hitherto unsuccessful effort made by
the Allies to conclude peace with Turkey, viz. : (1) the Treaty of Sevres, signed in
August L920, but never ratified, and now virtually dead ; (2) the proposals made at
the London Conference of March 1921, but not accepted either by the Greeks or the
Turks (or if accepted by one party in any particular, then declined by the other);
(3) the bases of a resumed discussion suggested by me in Paris in June 1921, but
rendered abortive by the refusal of the Greeks to accept Allied intervention. We are
now about to make a fourth attempt. The Allies cannot afford another failure ;
and although the position has been rendered more difficult by the Angora
escapade of the French, and by the increasing intractability of the Angora
Turks, the following symptoms are not unfavourable : the complete (though
never too dependable) rally of the Italians to our side ; the disgust created in France,
quite as much as here, by the Franklin-Bouillon trick ; the consequent re-established
unity of the Allies; the consciousness of the Greeks that their Asia Minor ambitions
are no longer realisable and that their resources do not admit of protracted warfare;
and, finally, some indications that the Turks also are tired of war and want peace. In
these circumstances a new programme is required, adjusted to the new conditions and
more liberal in its term! to the Turks—but, at the same time, a programme that the
Greeks can accept and which the Allies will be prepared to enforce. I have prepared
a draft of such proposals; and, in order that they may be compared with their
predecessors, I have had them printed in parallel columns.
If the Cabinet give their general assent to the revised terms, I would then propose
to send copies of the paper as printed below to the Foreign Ministers of France and
Italy, in order that they may study them before we meet in Paris early in January.
I had offered to go over after Christmas ; but the Italian Minister cannot be there
before the second week in the new yeaf.
My plan of action contemplates two stages : (a) the meeting of the three Foreign
Ministers at Paris, in order to arrive at an Allied agreement as to the terms, and as
to the method of applying them ; ( 6 ) a subsequent meeting of the Supreme Council in
order to place them before the Turks and Greeks. I have suggested Constantinople
as the place of final meeting, because 1 think it would be desirable to get away
from the press atmosphere of Paris, and in a less degree London ; and because at
Constantinople we ought to get Mustapha Kemal himself. The Turks would, of
course, constitute their own delegation, for it is with the Sultan’s Government
that we have to conclude peace. But it should be easy to make clear that Angora
must be represented by its chief.
The most difficult stage will be the decision of the Allies, which* must be reached in
Paris in advance, as to the steps to be taken by them in the event of a breakdown at
Constantinople, whether duo to the Greeks or the Turks.
Such a breakdown may occur in one of three ways : the Greeks alone, the Turks
alone, or both together, may refuse our terms ; or the refusal of one or both of them
may take the form ol acceptance with impossible reservations.
In the first case, Greece herself, and the Greek army in Asia Minor especially,
would be, in the long run, so much at the mercy of a peaceful blockade and other
indirect pressure, that any threat from the Allies should suffice to bring Greece to
reason, quite apart from any offer of help to the Turks. In the last resort this threat
might have to be used.
If* the Turks refuse, a more difficult situation arises. It must be remembered,
however, that never since August 1920 has there been a really united Allied attempt
to coerce Turkey, and even then no formal blockade of the Black Sea and Mediterranean
ports was attempted. If such a sea control was attempted by the three Allies, and