Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎101v] (202/348)

cordially recognise the spirit of amity and goodwill in which they have been 0 ere *
If 1 now draw attention to certain points on which His Majesty s Goveinmen ave
found and still find some difficulty in reconciling these assurances, and the de ai e
arguments by which they are supported, with the actual text ol the agreement o e
20th October, this is due to a desire, not to prolong controversy, but to remove any
misgivings that may still survive, and which might become a source ol conceivable
misunderstanding in the future.
4 . 1 will deal first with a question with which British public opinion, and,
indeed, the sentiment of the civilised world, is profoundly concerned namely, the
protection of the non-Turkish minorities in Cilicia. Whatever view may be taken
of the precise validity of the Tripartite Agreement and the underlying intention of
article (i. the Trench Government will hardly dispute that that agreement repre
sented not only a definite pledge on the part of France towards her other Allies to
undertake in Cilicia the common Allied task of protecting the minorities of Turkey,
but also the immediate assumption of a definite responsibility towards those minori
ties themselves, who had been admittedly encouraged by the continued Allied
occupation of Cilicia and by the published terms of the Tripartite Agreement to
return there.
5. The French Government will readily understand, therefore, the apprehen
sions felt by His Majesty's Government at finding in the agreement no guarantees
for the safety of these people beyond the amnesty of article 5 and the general
declaration of the Kemalist Government, as to the minority rights in article 5. I
need hardly remind you that while Part IV of the Treaty of Sevres provides a
measure of restitution for the serious injuries inflicted upon the minorities since the
1st August, 1914, and for the renewal of those necessary privileges accorded to them
by the Turkish Government throughout Turkey before the war, no counterpart to
tfiese provisions exists in the minority treaties concluded with the European
countries. Yet it is only the guarantees afforded by the latter treaties which the
Kemalist Government in article 6 of the present agreement have declared themselves
ready to offer. In fact, the value of this article and of article 5 depends exclusively
on that loyalty of the Kemalist Government ‘‘to keep and execute engagements " as
to which sanguine views are expressed by the French Government in your note. His
Majesty's Government in the light both of past history and of recent events find it
difficult at present to share those views, and they would fain hope that in any final
treaty of peace the Allies may insist upon obtaining Turkish assent to the fuller
safeguards of the Treaty of Sevres. In the meantime, however, the grave responsi
bility of withdrawing the protection of her troops has been taken by France, and the
presence of a limited number of special French representatives in Cilicia during
and after the evacuation is the sole additional guarantee that has been provided for
the security of the jeopardised sections of the population. His Majesty’s Government,
while convinced that the French Government will lend its utmost efforts to the safe
guarding of their interests, cannot conceal the fact that they regard the situation
with no small anxiety.
6 . There is another feature of the agreement, namely, the formal revision of the
northern frontier of Syria provided for by article 8 of the Angora Agreement, as to
which it is necessary to say something. I do not wish to dwell here upon the extent
of the surrendered territory, although this is far from inconsiderable, nor upon the
danger that the normal number of its inhabitants may have been swollen since the
armistice by an influx of Christian refugees; but His Majesty's Government cannot
remain indifferent to the manifest strategic importance to their position in Irak of
the return of the track of the Bagdad railway to Turkey, or of the transfer to that
Power of the “ localities " of Jeziret-Ibn-Omar and Nisibin. So far as His Majesty’s
Government are aware, the latter transfer has never been contemplated up to this
date, and no attempt has been made to ascertain their views upon it. For the rest,
while they readily accept the French Government's assurance of their determination
that no movement of Turkish troops over the Syrian portion of the Bagdad line with
hostile intention against Irak shall be permitted, they apprehend, nevertheless, that
article 10 of the agreement as it now stands may be found to preclude the French
Government from arresting such movements m time of peace, whatever their ultimate
object might prove to be.
7. Thirdly, the misgivings expressed by His Majesty’s Government at certain
features of article 10 have not been altogether dispelled by your explanations. Apart
from the immediate and premature advantage gained by France by this transfer of
a large portion of the Bagdad line to a French company in advance—and therefore
possibly to the prejudice—of the reciprocal Allied arrangements contemplated by