Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎90v] (180/348)

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Rumbold reported that the Kemalist Minister for Foreign Affairs, Youssou eni ‘ l ’
in a long and not unreasonable reply to the High Commissionei s pio es ^
Greek and Armenian deportations in Asia Minor, had concluded that ie ca
East could only be pacified if Smyrna were restored to Turkey. No pa ! ‘ l
would be of any avail. A complete end must be put to the invasion of ± sia x mo
by the Greeks, and, he added, in Sir H. Rumbold’ s words— £< almost as an after
thought,” a similar course must be adopted in respect of the Greek occupation oi
Thrace. . , ^
Thirdly, in a very recent speech reported by the “ Morning Post Uonstanu-
nople correspondent on the 26th September, Mustapha Kemal said . . . we \\an
peace and we are ready to make peace. My own opinion is that there is not any
obstacle to such aim.” All he demanded was recognition of their existence an
national independence. “ Mr. Lloyd George on the 16th August m the Butisi
House of Commons indicated intervention in favour of the winner of the wai, and
I am hopeful that Mr. Lloyd George will not go back on his word.
These are of course only vague indications of a readiness to treat, but they aie
perhaps significant coming after the Greek retirement. They seem to justify
the general appreciation of the situation given in Sir H. Rumbold s despatch of
the 20th September. “ I find that my colleagues share my impression that the
Nationalists would be glad to make peace as they realise their exhausted state.
I personally do not believe, however, that they would be satisfied with less than
the solution contemplated at Paris in June last with regard to Smyrna {i.e., an
autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty, a mixed gendarmerie undei a
proportion of Allied officers and gradual retirement of Greek troops). Looking
at the situation from here it would seem that we must await further de\elopnient
of military situation and see whether the Greeks will be able to carry out then
programme of destroying the railway between Eskishehr and Angora, and creating
a desert without hindrance from the Nationalists. A few weeks should be sufficient
to judge of the effect on the internal situation in Greece of the serious check they
have received. We therefore think that towards the end of October the Allies
may find the moment favourable for action.” . .
In short, the Kemalists would probably not refuse Allied intervention m the
shape of an invitation to a conference by the Supreme Council. Whether terms
• could be agreed upon and offered on a basis acceptable to them is a very different
matter, which I will discuss presently.
One condition, however, it will not be disputed, is an essential preliminary to
any such conference, supposing the two combatants to be willing to attend it.
The Allies must agree in advance, preferably with Greece, but certainly among
themselves, on the main modifications of the Treaty of Sevres which will
be reasonably likely to satisfy the Kemalists.
The terms of such a settlement can, for the purposes of convenient
consideration, be divided into tw'o main categories :— >
I. Those which mainly concern Greece and Turkey.
II. Those which mainly concern the Principal Allies and Turkey.
I. The crux is undoubtedly, as it has been all along, the Smyrna zone. At the
June Conference in Paris there w T as agreement among the Principal Allies in
proposing an autonomous province under Turkish sovereignty administered by a
Christian Governor (incidentally Greece would be more likely to accept and
Turkey might w'ell offer a Turkish subject of Greek race as Governor) with the
assistance of a mixed gendarmerie under European officers; Greek troops to be
withdrawn as soon as the gendarmerie could ensure security in the province.
It may I think be taken as axiomatic that the Kemalists will never make a
peace with Greece on less favourable terms than these, unless the Allies are
prepared to unite in support of Greece and in hostility to Turkey (by which I
mean the formal supply of arms and financial assistance to Greece and the blockade
of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Kemalist ports at the least). But it seems
equally axiomatic that France, with King Constantine on the throne of Greece,
anxious to recuperate herself economically in Turkey, and probably committing
herself to some support of Turkish aspirations in her negotiations in Angora,
will not agree so to support Greece. It is hardly more likely that the Italians will
support Greece with regard to Smyrna. It is true that the Italian Government
has recently sat rather carefully on the fence as between Greeks and Turks and as
between ourselves and the French, but w’e know’ from secret sources that they