Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎87r] (173/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
EASTERN (Turkey). [July 1.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[E 7570/143/44] No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).
(No. 1828.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, July 1, 1921.
THE French Ambassador came to the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to
present a communication from M. Briand. The Greek Government having refused
to accede to the suggestion made by the Powers that Greece should place herself in
their hands, with a view to the' suspension of hostilities in Asia Minor and the
conclusion of peace with Turkey, M. Briand now proposed that a joint notification
should be addressed to Athens, warning the Greeks of the dangers of the course they
were pursuing, and throwing upon them the responsibility for the resumption of the
war and the still further arrestation of the conclusion of peace in the East. M. Briand
proposed, as a second step, that the facilities which had hitherto been given to Greek
warships at Constantinople, and the use which Greece had been permitted to make of
that place as a port of call and revictualling, as well as the use which had been
conceded to her of the Marmora, should, in accordance with strict neutrality, be
withdrawn. Only by these means, M. Briand was convinced, could matters be brought
to an early head and hostilities, even at the eleventh hour, prevented.
I replied that I did not feel able to entertain either proposal. The first was
superfluous, because we had already told the Greeks, in the telegram which 1 had
drafted in Paris and which had been approved by the three Powers, that, if the Greek
Government preferred to decline our mediation, the exclusive responsibility would rest
upon themselves. I did not, therefore, see any point in repeating the threat at the
present moment, or stating again what was an obvious truism. It could have no effect,
either as a rebuke or as a menace. As regards the second suggestion, the advantages
accorded to the Greeks had been recommended to us from Constantinople, where it
could not be said that a very pro-Greek feeling prevailed, as entirely consistent with
the strict neutrality which we, at any rate in this country, had pursued ; and, as long
as it was open to the Turks to obtain supplies of men, money and arms from Bolshevik
Russia without fear of any interruption, it seemed to me a one-sided proposal to apply
this particular form of coercion to the Greeks. In my view, the only safety lay in a
continuation of the policy of strict impartiality to which the British Government, at
least, had all along been faithful.
As regards the general situation, I acquainted the Ambassador with the information
which we had lately received from our military experts, both in Constantinople and in
Smyrna, which led us to form a more favourable view' of the morale and equipment
of the Greek army than we had previously been led to adopt; and I remarked that, if
these accounts were true, it was not for a moment to be expected that the Greek army
would decline to resume a conflict in which it appeared to expect an initial victory.
In all probability, although what had happened at Ismid w r as an unfavourable omen,
the Greeks might expect to obtain some such preliminary advantage. If they held
this view of their own chances, it was out of the question to expect them, because of
any representations that we were inclined to make to them, to desist; although it
seemed to me extremely likely that, once the initial success had been obtained, they
would, of their own accord, appeal to our good offices.
The situation, I admitted, would not be rendered any easier by such a develop
ment, because the kind of terms that we had considered when 1 was in Paris might be
more difficult to obtain from the Greeks if victorious than if they had not fought at all.
On'^the other hand, should the issue turn the other way and the Turks be victorious in
the impending struggle, we should find them also more difficult to deal with than the}’'
might be before the fighting recommenced.
The prospect, therefore, was not, in my judgment, very encouraging either way;
but, however that might be, it seemed to me a useless expedient to attempt to
intervene at the present stage, and I could only hope that, before long, whatever the
result of the impending hostilities might be, a more favourable opportunity might
occur.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.
[6538 a —1] xd