Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎82v] (164/348)

M. Briand explained to him at some length that it was intended to safegmud
Italian rights under the agreement.
Lord Curzon pointed out that His Majesty’s Government must insist on the
maintenance of responsibility for the Christian minorities.
Lord Curzon then raised the question of procedure at Athens and C onstantinople,
and discussed how far the Allies should recognise the duality between Constantinople
and Angora. It might be found desirable for each of the Allies to send a representative
to the latter place, but he emphasised the supreme importance of all three Governments
acting together and conducting negotiations in common, and he referred Co am
condemned the French and Italian separate agreements with the Nationalists. H/ m
agreement were arrived at it might be by the three Powers acting together and signing
a single document, not by each Power seeking to obtain a separate agreement am
special advantages for itseli. He also insisted that the offer to Turke\ s 1011 ( ^c
accompanied by an intimation of penalties for refusal.
M. Briand did not agree, as he considered that the Allied stick was not big enough
to be effective and would only irritate the Turkish extremists. If any threats were to-
be made, he would prefer to threaten both sides, but, in the circumstances, he would
abstain from threatening either party at the beginning.
Lord Curzon repeated that there was no case for threatening the Greeks, but that
the British Government feared that concessions to the Turks would be fruitless unless
accompanied by a threat.
M. Briand said that the french nation w T ould not tolerate a conflict with the 1 inks
by an anti-Turkish or pro-Greek geste.
Lord Curzon said that British opinion was equally opposed to going to war. But
if the Turks refused the concessions offered to them, these must automatically lapse.
%
M. Briand agreed. He added that the psychological moment had arrived for
mediation, since both sides were in a difficult situation. It was the duty of the Allies
to do what they could, and he personally believed they would succeed. He enquired
whether His Majesty’s Government could not approach the Soviet Governmentwith a
view to cutting off this source of supply to the Turks. 1 he threat involved in this
procedure would have a great effect on Turkish extremists.
Lord Curzon pointed out that the Nationalists had a treaty with Moscow and were
in closest possible touch with them. The object of the Allies was to detach the lurks
from Moscow. His Majesty’s Government were prepared to promise all possible
assistance to the Turkey of the future if mediation were accepted. He doubted,
however, whether it would be*of the slightest use to approach the Soviets.
The Italian Ambassador wns of like opinion.
The meeting then broke up.
M. Briand.
M. Berthelot.
M. Kammerer.
June 19, 10*30 a.m.
Present:
Lord Curzon. Italian Ambassador.
Lord Hardinge. Signor Galli.
Sir H. Rumbold.
Mr. Vansittart.
Mr. Osborne.
Lord Curzon read the draft telegram to Athens which he had prepared, and gave
a copy to M. Briand and the ^ Italian Ambassador, both of wiiom expressed themselves
as delighted with its terms. The latter undertook to submit it immediately to his
Government.
M. Briand enquired whether the telegram should be despatched before the three
Governments had agreed on the exact terms to be submitted to the Greeks and Turks.
Lord Curzon thought the telegram should be sent at once, but stated his readiness
to proceed to the immediate settlement of the proposed terms of settlement.