Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎78v] (156/348)

French had followed, or were now able to follow, our example in sending a piominen
civilian, I was certain that much better results would be obtained. 1 thought ia
the French attitude in supporting General Le Rond had been one of the main
contributory causes of the trouble. Now, however, that the commission wme
functioning better, it seemed to me superfluous and unwise to complicate the matter
by sending a fresh body of experts to over-ride them. We had accepted this proposal
merely in order to make things easier for M. Briand, but we now thought that it
was more than doubtful whether it possessed any merit. Much the best thing would
surely be to get the commission, after establishing their position, to make another
report to the Allies. The matter could then be brought before a meeting of the
Supreme Council—and here I pointed out that the delay in summoning the latter,
which we were ready to attend at any moment, was due exclusively to M. Briand—-
and, if the Supreme Council wanted expert assistance, either in examining the
report of the commission or in arriving at a decision themselves, they could doubtless
procure it.
Inasmuch as I was about to send to Paris the important despatch inviting
French discussion and co-operation in the settlement of the troublous affairs of
Turkey and Greece, I thought it only right to acquaint the French Ambassador
with the decisions of His Majesty’s Government and the step I was on the eye of
taking. Accordingly, I explained to him the exact sequence of events—not failing
to point out the disastrous failure that had attended the attempt of the French
Government to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal behind our backs. I indicated
the dangers of the present position. I explained the policy wdiich we had decided
to recommend, namely : a mutual desistence from hostilities (unless the Greeks and
Turks had already come to blows) with a view to negotiations to be undertaken by
the Powers, these negotiations to involve certain very considerable concessions to
the Turks, including a substantial modification as regards the future position of
Smyrna; while, as regards the Greeks, an enquiry would be made into the conditions
under which, if the negotiations were either refused by the Turks or broke down,
the existing embargo upon the Greek purchase of arms, ammunition, aeroplanes, &c.,
could be removed, and a blockade instituted in the Black Sea in order to prevent the
Kemalist forces from obtaining Bolshevik supplies. I told the Ambassador that the
despatch concluded with an offer on my part to go to Paris any day, in order to
discuss matters with M. Briand.
His Excellency, accepting my general account of the situation, expressed
unofficially warm sympathy with the object that I had in view, and did not think
that it would meet with anything but assent from the French Government.
Incidentally, he was very curious to know why it was that M. Veniselos had been
in this country, and what was the nature of the consultations that had taken place
with him. Obviously the Ambassador suspected that there had been some sort of
plot between His Majesty's Government and that statesman.
I told him frankly that the very reverse was the case. I had seen M. Veniselos
only with a view of ascertaining from him whether he thought it likely, in the
present circumstances, that the Greek Government would accept such a suggestion
as I had outlined, and whether, had he himself been in power, he Avould have given
it a warm or a cold welcome. I had been relieved to hear from M. Veniselos that,
while he expressed no opinion upon the present position of the Greek forces in
Asia Minor, or on the policy of King Constantine, he nevertheless agreed that an
attempt should be made to compose matters at the present juncture, upon lines in
general accord with those that I had mentioned.
The Comte de Saint-Aulaire evidently regarded this information as of great
value, and thought that it would make a material difference to the attitude of Kino-
Constantine and his advisers in pursuing a reasonable policy if they had any idea
that, in doing so, they were not liable to be assailed by M. Veniselos and his party
for lack of patriotism or an abandonment of their country’s interests.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.