Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎75r] (149/348)

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CIRCUL A TED T O TH g CABIN""'
[This Document is the Propert y of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
EASTERN (Arabia). [April 6 .j
CONFIDENTIAL. Sect]on 3.
[E 4164/3816/65] No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Laris).
(No. 990.)
My Lord, ■ Foreign Office, Aprrt 6 , 1921.
} N the course of a conversation this afternoon the French Ambassador reverted to
Die question of the Emir Feisal and Abdullah, and repeated to me, with even greater
emphasis than before, the views which are entertained by the French Government upon
the question.
As regards the anti-French pronouncements and actions of Abdullah in Trans-
jordania, Sir Eyre Crowe had remarked that the proclamations to which the French
Government objected had in all probability been issued before the pressure applied
to Abdullah by his brother, Feisal, and his father, King Hussein, at the instance of the
British Government. This had turned out to be true so far as these particular proclama
tions were concerned, but further investigation had revealed to the French Government
that proclamations or pronouncements of a date posterior to our intervention had been
made, not less hostile to France in their phraseology and purpose. Further, in the
“ Times” of this morning was reported an interview by its correspondent with Abdullah,
in which he had expressed himself in terms equally unfavourable to France.
I replied that the question of the future position of Abdullah in Transjordania was
now in the hands, not of the Foreign Office, but of the Colonial Secretary, but that from
such information as I had received I was convinced that Mr. Churchill would only
acquiesce in Abdullah remaining there provided he gave full assurances as to not
pursuing an anti-French policy, and further, I said that 1 might tell the Ambassador in
confidence, though not for official use, that so anxious was the Colonial Secretary to
bring about this result, that he had actually proposed the stationing of a British
garrison in the country, in order to ensure that good relations and peace on the frontiers
should prevail. I had no idea whether the Government would or would not accept the
suggestion, but at any rate it was conclusive evidence of our bona jides in the matter.
As regards Feisal, his Excellency produced a fresh weapon from his armoury by
reminding me that on an earlier occasion l had protested very strongly to his predecessor,
M. Cambon, against the possible selection by the French of Mohammed Said as successor
to Feisal at Damascus, at a time when it was thought that the French might conceivably
fall out with the latter. Mohammed Said was an individual who had been expelled
from the country by Lord Allen by. Inasmuch as the French Government had at once
given us the assurance that we demanded, how could we reciprocally refuse to meet
their wishes about Feisal in Mesopotamia?
I replied that, quite apart from the personalities of the two individuals, there was
no analogy whatever between the two cases. What we had asked the French io do
was to refrain from setting up, by an arbitrary act of their own, a man of no standing,
whose conduct and character were open to the gravest suspicion. What the French
were asking us to do was not to refrain from setting up Feisal as Ruler of Mesopotamia
ourselves, because that we neither had the power nor the intention of doing, but to
refuse to accept him if he were chosen by the people of Mesopotamia.
The French Government, I said, seemed to argue as though we were going to
behave in Mesopotamia in exactly the same way as they were behaving, and would
probably continue to behave, in Syria. Such was not the case.
We were endeavouring to carry out the promises as regards the institution ol an
Arab Government and an Arab ruler which we had repeatedly made since the day when
we marched into Bagdad. Three years ago we had asked the population of Mesopotamia
to choose their Government and their ruler. They were at that time too feeble or too
disunited to do either. They had now got, or were in the process of getting, their
Government, and they were likely before long to choose their ruler. It, as I had before
told his Excellency, they chose Feisal, not because we imposed him, but because they
wanted him, no British Minister could get up in either House of Parliament and state
that we declined to ratify this choice because the French had fallen out with Feisal in
Syria and desired us, as an act of friendship to them, to reject the victim of their
quarrel. I should decline myself to do anything of the sort.