Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎74r] (147/348)

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could not be accepted, inasmuch as the conversation was conducted in French, of
which Feisal had a good mastery, and General Gouraud was most explicit as to the
words which had been employed.
To this I replied that I did not of course desire to contest the veracity of
General Gouraud, but that if the Emir Feisal had used such language, which was
conceivable, the circumstances must be taken into account, and it must be remembered
that he was only using the traditional weapons of every Oriental in an anxious
position, who invariably offered his services alternately to both sides in order to see
what were the best terms that he could get. In the East we must expect such tactics,
and if any Government were to decline to deal with an Oriental chieftain because he
had at some time intrigued against them, or offered to side with another party, no
transactions would ever take place. We did not, therefore, consider ourselves
debarred from treating with Feisal by any such reports, which were further,
I believed, entirely denied by him. However, as the Ambassador had raised the
question of Feisal and Mesopotamia. I wished to take the opportunity of making
quite clear to him, in language which could not possibly be misunderstood, the
attitude which His Majesty's Government felt bound to adopt.
Since Feisal came to England the Foreign Office had had no official com
munication with him with regard to Mesopotamia, and he had had no communication
with us. He had never mentioned the word “Mesopotamia." and had never asked
us to support his candidature, or indeed hinted that he desired or intended to become
a candidate. This did not mean that he might not conceivably do so; but it did
mean that no plot existed between us on the matter.
The position in Mesopotamia was this :—
Just as the French had found themselves involved in enormous difficulties in
Cilicia and in Syria, difficulties from which they had only been able to extricate
themselves in Cilicia by wholesale retirement, and from which it was more than
probable that they would only find release in Syria by a somewhat similar expedient
in the future, so the British Government had encountered difficulties in Mesopotamia
which had involved them in overwhelming responsibilities, in constant and fierce
criticism in Parliament and in the press, and in the expenditure of money, which
was altogether out of reason to expect that we could continue to bear.
In these circumstances, we had publicly announced our intention, which was
indeed in strict accordance with the declaration of policy, affirmed by the French
as well as ourselves in November 1918, to let the Arabs of Mesopotamia set up their
own Government. They had been engaged for some time past in taking the necessary
steps. The time must shortly arrive when the people of Mesopotamia would tell us
whether they desired a single ruler, and if so, whom. When that moment arrived,
should they be sufficiently united in favour of any candidate who could give us good
reason to suppose that he would be able to set up a stable government in that country,
we should accept him. There were, I believed, several candidates in the field. There
were two local candidates, both of whom were pressing their claims. Supposing one
or other of them was asked for by a united Mesopotamia, then we should take him.
Supposing, on the other hand, they asked' for Abdullah, who at one time had been
mentioned as a possible candidate, but who, so far as I knew, had not yet put forward
his claim, we should take him. Supposing they asked for Feisal, we should take him.
I wished there to be no misunderstanding on this point. We should have to make
our decision in the interests both of ourselves and of Mesopotamia.
We had, since the mandate was given to France for Syria, and since their
position in Cilicia had been recognised by the Powers, never lifted a little finger to
interfere with their political arrangements there. Personally, I thought that many
of these were gravely mistaken, and I anticipated that the French would soon be
driven to the solution to which we were being forced in Mesopotamia; but when
that day arrived, or if it had arrived earlier, and if they had been called upon to
nominate a single ruler for Syria, whether they had chosen Feisal, Abdullah or Ali,
or anybody else, we should not have objected. We should have regarded it as their
affair, and not ours. In the same way, I could not admit that they had any right to
interfere with our choice in a similar case in respect of Mesopotamia. We certainly
should not arrive at a decision with any desire to embarrass the French, or act in a
manner unfair or disloyal to them, but the interests both of expediency and of honour
would compel us to take a candidate who represented the unfettered choice of the
people.
The Ambassador, who had listened to these remarks with attention, said that
he did not dispute our perfect right to act in the manner that I had foreshadowed.