Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎58v] (116/348)

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uniform and consistent policy on every side. In such a case none of the Border States
of Russia was more likely to be treated sympathetically than Georgia ; but for the
moment I thought that she would do well to hold her ambitions in suspense.
There was, I told him, another aspect of the case which rendered it difficult at
present to repose that complete confidence in the Government of his country which was
predicated by his request. What, I asked, were the Georgian Government doing with
their Bolshevik neighbours on the north ? What was the purport and what the
validity of their alleged treaty with the Soviet Government, to which the latter were
always pointing as more or less placing Georgia within their sphere ? What was the
truth of the report that the Georgian Government had recently accepted a considerable
loan from the Soviet Government? What were M. Kyrof and the Soviet Delegation,
reported at one time to consist of from seventy to eighty members, still doing in fiflis
as the guests of the Georgian Government ? These rumours left us in some doubt as
to what the real attitude and policy of the Georgian Government were, though his
Government were always protesting to us their entire hostility to Soviet aggression.
It was very desirable that the Minister should give me some explanation on this
matter.
He replied that his Government had been in a very tiirht place when the
Bolsheviks appeared upon the scene ; that it was quite true that they had been forced
to conclude a treaty with Bolsheviks; that their dire straits ought to be taken into
account ; and that they had no intention of allowing themselves to be enslaved by
their more powerful neighbours Indeed, I gathered that his Government would
evade or repudiate the agreement as soon as they safely could. As regards the
alleged loan, he warmly denied that his Government either had accepted or would
accept a penny of money in anv form from the Soviet Government. As to the Russian
Delegation in Tiflis, their numbers had now been reduced to seven or eight, and their
dangerous activities had been circumscribed. M. Gueguechkori gave me, in fact, the
most emphatic assurances about the good faith of his Government in the matter.
One further question I put to him, namely, what were the relations of Georgia
with Armenia ? It seemed to me that the two countries were fighting the same battle,
and that only by joint action could they hope to win it. The most sinister feature of
the situation in the Caucasus was the combination between Bolshevik forces coming
from the north and Turkish Nationalist forces coming from the south. Their object was
to overrun and destroy the independent existence of Armenia, and, if this were
accomplished, where, I asked, would Georgia be ? She would infallibly be the next
victim. In these circumstances, it seemed to me to be to the interest of Georgia
herself to throw in the whole of her forces with Armenia to protect the latter from the
common foe.
The Minister assured me in reply that this was entirely the view of his Government.
They were thoroughly conscious of the common danger, and were co-operating with
Armenia to the best of their ability.
How far all the protestations and assurances of M. Gueguechkori were in strict
accord with the facts I have not the knowledge to enable me to say, but I place them
on record as being not unimportant in the history of the case.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.