Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎56r] (111/348)

[This PoGiiment is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
EASTERN.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[May 17.]
Section 1,
[E 4938/39/44] No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).
(No. 465.) .
gi r Foreign Office, May 17, 1920.
THE Italian Charge d’Affaires had asked.to see me this afternoon with regard to
our refusal at the last moment to sign the tripartite agreement between Italy, I ranee
and Great Britain concerning the zones of economic preference in Asia Minor. He
pleaded strongly, on behalf of Signor Nitti, that we should still sign.
I admitted quite frankly that I had told him a week ago that I was prepared to
accede to this course, but I explained to him that when I did so I had acted upon
imperfect information. I had not then seen the final text of the agreement, and I had
thought that we were bound by the engagements entered into at San Remo to sign and
publish it at an early date. Under this misapprehension, I had given my assent.
When, after seeing him, I had received and perused the final text I had discovered in
article 11 that the agreement was not to be published or to come into force until the
Treaty of Peace with Turkey made by the three contracting Powers came into force
also. In other words, the publication and execution of the agreement could not take
place until the Turkish Treaty was ratified, which might not be for several months
from now. .
In these circumstances I asked Signor Preziosi what was the point or the
advantage of signing now ? From the Italian point of view I could conceive of no
advantage whatsoever, unless Signor Nitti desired to have the Parliamentary advantage
of stating or letting it be known that he had obtained this quid pro quo for the
promises made in the Treaty of London.
Signor Preziosi denied that it was required for this purpose, or that any publicity
at all would be given to the signature of the agreement. _ # _ .
I said that I could not reconcile this with the extreme anxiety which Signor Nitti
had betrayed in San Remo and elsewhere. He had not concealed in any way that he
wished to point to the fait accompli, as a vindication of his very earnest and successful
defence of the interests of his country. I added, however, that, whether Signor Nitti
did or did not observe Parliamentary silence, the fact of signature must at once leak
out. It would be known, if not at once, at any rate in two or three weeks time, that
a document of some sort had been signed. In these circumstances publication would
be forced upon us, and I could not imagine anything worse from the point of view
either of Italy or of France, who were the two Powers particularly affected by the
agreement. It was certain, as I had often pointed out at the Conferences in London
and in San Remo, that the arrangement would be severely criticised. It would, in all
probability, excite the vehement hostility of President Wilson and of American public
opinion, though the British Government would be less exposed to such attack because
they were the one party who had nothing to gain by the agreement. Further, the
Turks would at once be up in arms against a proposal which might render their
signature of the Peace Treaty more difficult even than it was already likely to be. In
these circumstances, signature at this moment appeared to me, from the point of view
of expediency, to be the very 7 worst move that either the Italian or any other
Government concerned could make.
There was, I said, an additional reason against signature at this juncture. It was
certain that the Turkish delegates to Paris would make strong representations for the
modification of the terms ol the Treaty of Peace, and if any such moditication were
considered it might involve an alteration of the terms of this agreement, to which
accordingly it would be much better if the signatures of the contracting parties had not
previously 7 been affixed. In the other alternative, the Turks might decline to sign the
Peace Treaty altogether, in which case the tripartite agreement would fall to the
ground and the act of signature would turn out to have been a folly.
From all these points of view I argued to the Italian Charge d Affaires that my
second thoughts had been the better, and that his Government would be well advised
if they desisted from applying any pressure in the matter.
He then changed the subject, and asked me if I would instruct the British High
Commissioner in Constantinople to assist the Italian company in opening operations at
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