Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎51v] (102/348)

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The conditions imposed on Germany are to be the first step in the restriction
and limitation of armament in general; and the realisation of this disarmament is
one of the first duties of the League of Nations.
I. Admitting that the League of Nations will he capable ot protecting its
members against the aggression of its neighbours, the effective armed forces ot a
State should be calculated first and foremost on the basis of the internal situation
of that State. The events of the last few days have clearly shown how shaky is t ae
political foundation on which Germany rests. These events have once moie, and m
the gravest wav, shaken the political'and economic situation. The troops at ttie
disposal of the' German Government for the suppression of disorders provoked by
the Extremists on the right and left will, as regards the re-establishment of political
and economic order, scarcely suffice to re-establish the power of the Government and
stabilise it if there is no extension of the centres of agitation and if the parts of
Germany which have hitherto been quiet continue to remain so. Further, it will be
only by remaining indisputable masters of the situation that the Government will
be able to compel the rebels to give up the arms which are illegally in their posses
sion. It is certain that the Bolshevik element of the German population were not
prepaied for the outbreak of the reactionary cmy d'Etat at the moment when it
occurred. They therefore had not the time to concentrate all the revolutionarv
elements for an energetic and well-conducted reply. However, their reaction assumed
dimensions which were surprising and proved a solid organisation. If these elements
on their part assume the initiative of a revolution, it is to be feared that this move
would bieak out still more vigorously and simultaneously throughout Germany.
It would be a dangerous illusion to imagine that the re-establishment of order
has finally exercised the danger of a revolution. In view of the Bolshevik contagion
which may be noted to some extent everywhere; in view besides of Germany's
economic situation which continues to be extremely delicate, an appreciable,
improvement in the internal situation is not for a long time to be hoped for. After,
as before, the fire will continue to smoulder on the numerous revolutionary hearths of
Germany, the elements of disorder will continue to do their best to make the flames
blaze up, to extend their propaganda to the peaceful parts of Germany, and to excite
their population against the present order of things. They will find besides the
ground well prepared in consequence of the difficulties of the economic situation.
To that is to be added the fact that no consistent and certain appreciation of the
various political ideas has yet taken root in the great mass of the people. Incidents
of little importance, carelessnesses, and mistakes may determine in the future also an
unexpected and complete change in the feelings of the masses, and confront the
Government with new difficulties. Consequently, it is necessary that the Govern
ment should have at their disposal a means of preventing thereby revolutionary
attempts, or of suppressing them at once, should they none the less occur.
This means cannot be other than an adequate military force. In view of the
actual conditions, it is inconceivable that 100,000 men can be enough to maintain
the Government of a nation of 60,000,000. Besides, the lack of adequate military
forces would turn out to the disadvantage of the Allied Governments, because the
German Government would find it impossible to conform to stipulations of an
economic nature. Police forces cannot replace the army. They cannot be employed
outside their place of residence, the instruction which they possess has only in view
police duties; besides, they are not mobile, and they lack the organisation of a central
command. They can, indeed, assist the army and facilitate for it the details of
service in the big towns, but they will never be able to engage in important operations
and fighting. Since the police can never present themselves as a compact unit, they
will not be able by their existence alone to guard against disorder as military
formations can do. The map hereto attached shows how far the different units of an
army of 100,000 men would be dispersed through the entire country. The proposal
to surround the centres of agitation with garrisons was recognised to be
impracticable because it would have involved the complete stripping of vast regions
of troops. If. in consequence of the reduction of the armv to 100,000 men, it is
necessary to establish garrisons of troops in the manner indicated on the above-
mentioned map, the result would be an exaggerated breaking up of the effectives,
considerable difficulties in concentrating the troops for a common action, and the
necessity of entrusting important territorial powers to subaltern officials. It is clear
that in case of disorders suddenly breaking out on a large scale such an army could
never be effective, and its action would be doomed to failure by the very fashion in
which it would be brought about. According to the organisation set forth for the