Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎35r] (69/348)

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EASTERN.
[October 22.]
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1,
[144898] No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Mr. Kennard.
(No. 658.)
Sir, Foreign Office, October 22, 1919.
THE Italian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and raised three
points.
He was very much concerned at the opposition of Sir Eyre Crowe, in the
Supreme Council in Paris, to the proposal to include Italian troops amongst those
occupying the Aidin district, and wished me to telegraph instructions to him to
take up a less rigid attitude on the point, which involved Italian amour-propre, and
on which the majority, if not the whole, of the other Allied representatives were
against him.
I said that I was familiar only from telegraphic reports with the attitude taken
up by Sir Eyre Crowe, but that I thought it was due to the essential difference
between the military position in Asia Minor of the Italians on the one hand and of
the Greeks on the other. The Greek troops had been invited to Smyrna with the
knowledge and by the act of the Supreme Council. I myself thought that this was
the greatest mistake that had been made in Paris, and that it was the starting point
of most of the troubles which had since ensued. But, whether the step was right or
wrong, the Greek troops had appeared upon the scene with sanction from the
Powers, and they could justify their presence by that authority. On the other hand,
the Italians, by their descent upon Adalia, Scala Nuova, and other places without
the invitation or authority of the Paris Council, had alienated public opinion and
put themselves in the wrong. It was not surprising, therefore, that our representa
tive should not be inclined to encourage, still less to expand, an intrusion which had
taken place under such conditions.
The Ambassador replied by attributing the Adalia move to the mistaken policy
of Baron Sonnino, who had now fallen, but said that a sufficient justification for
it could be found in a statement which had been made by Mr. Balfour in the Foreign
Office in the autumn of 1917 at a Conference concerning the future Allied spheres
in Asia Minor—a Conference in which M. Cambon and the Italian Ambassador
himself had taken part. It was true that the actual arrangements proposed at this
Conference had come to nothing, but it had been followed by a letter from
Mr. Balfour, which admitted in the most ungrudging terms the Italian claims in
Asia Minor, and which the Italian Government looked upon as their justification
for anything they had since done in that region.
As I had never seen this communication, I could not, without further study,
express any opinion about it.
The next point raised by the Ambassador was with regard to the latest proposal
with regard to Fiume, which had been brought to Paris by Signor Tittoni within
the last few days.
As I had not yet seen this proposal, I was unable to discuss it.
The Ambassador, however, represented that it was the supreme and maximum
act of concession to which his Government could agree. He felt sure that it would
be accepted by all the Allies, with the possible exception of America; and he urged
me strongly—if, after reading it, I approved of its character—to telegraph to Lord
Grey to use all his influence in favour of its being accepted in Washington.
His Excellency, without alluding to the recent incident between our two Govern
ments arising out of the Fiume communiqud in the Italian press, descanted
upon the sensitive and agitated condition of his countrymen, who suspected
hostility and opposition at every turn ; and he earnestly pleaded that, in the course
of the forthcoming visit of General Diaz, some statement of a generous nature with
regard to the aspirations of Italy should be made by the Prime Minister or some
other Government spokesman, in order to restore matters to a proper footing.
Speaking of the long delay in the negotiation of the Turkish Peace, he expressed
a strong desire that it should be taken in hand without further delay, and he
flattered me by the remark that, if the matter were left in his hands and mine, he