Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎31r] (61/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Governmeixt]
[776 Z—1]
EASTERN.
J V-^-.
f^eptember 11.
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1,
[124999] No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.
(No. 5984.)
Sir, Foreign Office, September 11, 1919.
RECENT developments in the situation in the Caucasus arising out of the decision
to withdraw the British troops from that region lead me to think that it would be well
briefly to retrace the course of events, more especially in so far as the Armenians are
concerned.
I need not recall to you the circumstances in which we found ourselves forced to
occupy Transcaucasia, nor remind you that our original intention was merely to expel
the Turks and the Germans, to secure control of the Caspian Sea so as to prevent an
enemy invasion of Transcaspia, and to hold the railway from Baku to Batoum. As
time went on, however, it became clear that the peoples of the several small States
which, though formerly subject to Russia, had asserted their independence upon the
collapse of that Power, were unfit to stand alone, and would lapse into fratricidal
warfare if left to their own devices. They were further threatened with the danger of
extinction at the hands of General Denikin’s forces to the north of the Caucasus, that
officer making no pretence of friendship for the newly-found liberties of Georgia,
Daghestan, and Azerbaijan. Owing to our efforts these calamities have been averted
and a measure of law and order has been successfully maintained in the occupied regions.
In the early days of the British occupation our presence was regarded with various
feelings bv the local States and populations, being welcomed by some, but regarded
with suspicion by others, notably by the Georgians and the Tartars, on account Of our
relations with General Denikin, whose supposed ambitions they regarded with genuine
alarm. No sooner, however, had our intention to evacuate become generally known
than the benefits of our occupation were swiftly and universally realised, and passionate
appeals were addressed to us from every quarter to stay.
The policy of withdrawal was urged as early as March last by the Secretary of State
for War, and was finally decided upon, with your approval, on the 9th April, on which
date you informed me that the Supreme Council at Paris had decided that our forces
were to be replaced by Italian troops.
The news of our intended evacuation, and still more the proposed substitution of
Italian troops, who had no experience of and no connection with those parts of the
East, created a profound and unpleasant impression in the Caucasus. They were
received by General Milne, Admiral Calthorpe, Mr. Stevens (His Majesty’s consul at
Batoum) with unconcealed dismay. They represented that this policy would be a
betrayal of the Caucasian peoples, with whose aspirations towards independence we
had shown no small sympathy ; that the new States, if left unprotected in the early
stages ot‘ their struggle for independence, would probably lapse into Bolshevism ; that
there would be much internecine strife, and probably massacres of Christians on a large
scale ; and finally, that our reputation in the Middle East would suffer a damaging if
not a fatal blow. I confess that to a large extent I shared these apprehensions, all the
more that I was quite unable to believe in the practicability or likelihood of the
substitute of an Italian occupation.
In May rumours began to arrive that the Italians were disposed to reconsider
their decision to take our place, and I ventured in my telegram No. 735 of 23rd May to
ask yon to endeavour to hasten a decision on their part. Meanwhile it was decided on
military grounds to postpone our withdrawal, originally fixed for the 15th June, until
the 15th July, and subsequently again until the 15th .-August.
On the 2nd July I was informed by the Director of Military Intelligence that he
learned from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, then in Paris, that the Italians
had abandoned their intention to go to the Caucasus, and in your telegram No. 1126
of the 6th July you informed me that you too understood this to be the case. It
was not, however, until the 1st August that the Italian Ambassador was able to
confirm it. No change was, however, made in our decision to withdraw.