Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎27r] (53/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Governm ent.]
EASTERN. [August 11.j
CONFIDENTIAL. Sbctiox 1.
[115267] No. 1.
Earl Curzon to Mr. Lindsay.
(No. 459.)
Sir, Foreign Office, August 11, 1919.
THE American Ambassador called upon me at his own request this afternoon in
order to enquire about the position in the Caucasus.
By a fortunate coincidence, there had arrived only twenty-four hours before a
a letter from Mr. Balfour, in Paris, in which, anticipating the massacres that were
almost universally prophesied as certain to follow our contemplated evacuation of the
Caucasian regions, he had suggested that, while our troops were being withdrawn, an
attempt should be made to interest the American Government as the possible future
mandatory for Armenia, in the subject of the Caucasus, and that we might even
delay the concluding stages of our withdrawal if we could induce the American
Government to send military forces to take the place of ours.
I accordingly explained the situation with complete frankness to Mr. Davis; told
him the circumstances in which we had decided to withdraw our troops; explained the
stage which arrangements for withdrawal had already reached ; referred to the
abortive attempt to introduce the Italians on to the scene, and confirmed Mr. Balfour’s
apprehensions as to the local consequences that might be expected to follow the
departure of our troops.
I then asked the Ambassador these questions : Did he think that the American
Government were at all likely to entertain such a request if it was made to them ?
Had they the troops available in Europe or elsewhere who could be used for the
purpose ? Was it likely that Congress would be willing to accept a mandate for
Armenia or any other portion, larger or smaller, of the Turkish Empire ? If so, what
was the earliest date at which such a decision might conceivably be reached ? If the
American Government decided to assume responsibility for Armenia, was it probable
that they would extend their interest to the Caucasus as well ?
The Ambassador was very careful to explain in reply that he could not speak
authoritatively or officially for his Government on any of these matters. In so far,
however, as he was entitled to express an a priori opinion, he had very little difficulty
in doing so. In the first place, he said that the Americans now had only 100,000
troops remaining in Europe, the bulk of whom were under orders to return to their
country, and any of whom it would be impossible, in existing conditions, to move to
the Caucasus. Indeed, any despatch of American troops to that region could not be
attempted without the knowledge and consent of Congress. As regards the larger
question of a mandate, although he was aware that, on humanitarian and philanthropic
grounds, the American people were deeply interested in Armenia, yet he personally did
not believe that these considerations would induce his country to depart from the
twofold traditional basis of its foreign policy, namely, (a) the refusal to be entangled
in foreign alliances or commitments ; (6) a strict adherence to the Monroe Doctrine.
Moreover as soon as the American public began to realise—which they probably did
not at present—the inherent difficulties, political, ethnographical, physical, and
otherwise, of the Armenian problem, he felt very doubtful whether philanthrophy would
survive in the contest with expediency. As to an American mandate for Constantinople
or any other portion of the Turkish Empire, while it was conceivable that the American
nation might be attracted by such an idea, here again, expressing his personal opinion,
he did not believe that, in the last resort, it would take effect.
Summing up the situation, therefore, the Ambassador said that, while he saw no
reason why the request suggested by Mr. Balfour should not be made to the American
Government if we wished to make it, he did not anticipate that it would be attended
by any practical results.
In reply to further questions which I put to him, he informed me that he did not
think it probable that the American decision on the mandatory question would be
reached in a period of less than three months from now.
With this very uncertain and rather disquieting forecast of events, wffiich promised
litttle relief from our impending anxieties in respect of the situation in the Caucasus
and of the position in Asiatic Turkey in general, the American Ambassador took his
leave.
I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON