Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎18v] (36/348)

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the British taxpayer, and there is, so for as is known here, no guarantee that it will eyw
be recovered from the power or powers to whom the various mandates may eventually
£LSS 1 • ■*
For political reasons and owing to the undesirability of allowing the french to
establish themselves in active occupation of the disputed regions, it has been necessary
to disguise the expenditure as military expenditure and His Majestys treasury are
serioudy peturbed by this arrangement wliich was only tolerated under the impression
that a very early settlement would he reached by the Peace Conference, and that out
liabilities in this respect would thus shortly cease.
Egypt,—The situation in Egypt only comes within the scope of this review m so
far as the same forces are at work there as in Turkey, and as tne deplorable situation
which exists there is bound to react on Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, and indeed
throughout the East. Moreover, the sending of a mission to ascertain the wishes or
Syria'and Palestine as to their future form of Government is scarcely likely to be passed
over in silence by those who now control the current of political feeling in Egypt.
The same remark may perhaps also apply to the effect on India ol the promised
commission’s visit to Mesopotamia. . ...
Mesopotamia. —In Mesopotamia itself, the difficulties of administration caused by
demobilisation, &c., will become more and more accentuated unless an early decision is
leached as to the future of the country.
Mosul. —In the Mosul vilayet no satisfactory arrangements can be made until the
rights conceded to the French under the Sykes-Picot Agreement have been definitely
and entirely abandoned by them. It is not known here whether the commission
proposes to visit this area, but. if not it would seem that a recognition by the French of
the dc facto situation should be reached at the earliest possible moment.
Meanwhile, further to the north the French have apparently been engaging, since
the decision to send the commission to the East was taken, in a curious intrigue y ith
Sherif Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. and the Persians to throw Kurdistan under Persian sovereignty with a
view to savino- it from foiling into the orbit of Mosul. 11ns scheme, it seems, is also
to extend stilf further to the north and to embrace Russian Armenia with its capital,
Envan, and even to extend across the Gaspian and take m taaiakhs and some undefim d
part of Russian Turkestan.
II.— Districts more, varticularly affected by the decision of the Peace Conference to
hand over the Caucasus to the Italians.
We now leave behind the regions more directly affected by the despatch of the
proposed commission and reach an area where the problems arise from another decision
of the Peace Conference—the transfer of the Caucasus to Italian control.
Trans Caspia. —Trans-Caspia is already being evacuated, and the danger of the
penetration of Bolshevism into India and Persia from this side, and of complications m
Afghanistan, need only he mentioned in passing.
The Caspian—It is understood that arrangements are already being made to
transfer our naval control in the Caspian to the Italians, and this at a moment when
the spring offensive of the Bolsheviks from Astrakhan may be confidently expected. It
will he remembered that our naval authorities regarded the numerical superiority of the
Bolshevik fleet at Astrakhan with so much misgiving that they insisted upon measures
being taken to destroy it while it was still frozen in. This w^as to be done from the air,
and a strong air base was to be established at the north of Petrovsk for the purpose. I he
plan had for various reasons to he abandoned. It is now r proposed to entrust to Italian
sailors a task which our own British sailors regarded with considerable apprehension.
The objective of the Bolshevik fleet will be Baku, and if Baku falls the line of supply
of our forces in north Persia from Hamadan to Enzeli will be cut. M ill it be possible
to arrange in time for the substitution of a line of supply via Bagdad? Will it he
possible in any case for our forces to remain in Fnzeli and in North Persia if Baku
falls, and the control of the Caspian passes into Bolshevik hands ? If not, what will
he the political effect in Persia if we have to withdraw our forces ?
Caucasus. —Nor is the military outlook in the Caucasus itself any more encouraging.
Even if the Italians can provide the necessary troops and transport, is it likely that
the mixed and turbulent population of that region who have given us so much trouble
will welcome them ?
W 7 ill General Denikin, whom we have hitherto restrained with so much difficulty
from attacking the small republics, be more likely to respect the principle of self-
determination when placed betore him by an Italian General ! Can the Italians be