Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎9r] (17/348)

3
F repeated what I had once before said ; that, if he and I were dealing with the <
matter in Paris, I believed that we could settle it without difficulty ; but that, as the
matter was not in our hands in London, it did not seem to me of much use discussing
it here. On the other hand, as His Excellency was always complaining of British
policy and action, I should like to take the opportunity of saving two things to him.
The first was this : our interest in Mosul arose, not from any d priori desire to possess
or control that region (for two years ago no one dreamt that such a denouement was
likely), but solely from the fact that Mosul was united, physically, politically, and
administratively, with Mesopotamia; that the inhabitants of the Mosul Vilayet
declined to be severed from the populations of Middle and Lower Mesopotamia; and
that if, as seemed likely, Great Britain was to be entrusted with the future control of
Mesopotamia, Mosul, whether we liked it or not, must inevitably form a part of the
charge. The French knew this as well as we did, and in these circumstances I was at
a loss to understand why they continued to make such a fuss about the matter. Their
attitude appeared to me to be due to what I could not help regarding as a mistaken
view of both the validity and the feasibility of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. So long
as the French insisted on attaching literal and textual value to that document these
misunderstandings must arise. But why not admit at once, as His Excellency had
practically done in conversation with me, that as an Agreement it was utterly
impracticable and out-of-date, and that no real settlement could be based on its
provisions. The second point that I wished to bring to the Ambassadors attention was
the French attitude about Syria, which I found it equally difficult to understand, and
which was the justification of my remarks last week. Assuming that the joint Anglo-
French Declaration of last November, by which we accepted the principle of self-
determination in settling the future of these regions, was to be effective, how could the
French possibly maintain what I understood to be their present attitude with regard to
Syria ? If the Ambassador thought that the British had any particular desire to be at
Damascus or Homs or Aleppo, he was greatly mistaken. What we did desire was that
the Arab race should not be broken up, and that they should be allowed a voice in the
determination of their own future. Making every allowance for the sentimental,
historical, and traditional interests of France in that part of the world, how could she
defend the creation of a French State at Damascus unless the Arabs desired it? Only
yesterday, I had read a report from a British officer just returned from that city to the
effect that, if a plebiscite of its inhabitants were now taken, not 5 per cent, would vote
in favour of the French. Personally, I did not so much apprehend the solutions of the
present as I did the prospects of the future. Would it be a good thing for France
herself that she should commence her Syrian career by so marked an infringement of
the principles upon which she had agreed to start it? Still more, assuming these
difficulties to be overcome, and a French Dominion satisfying to the full the aspirations
of France to be created in that district, was it desirable that an almost certain source of
friction in the Arab world should be created for the future between ourselves and
France; a close, continuous, and loyal union between whom was essential to the future
peace of mankind ?
The only other subject discussed by the Ambassador and myself was the future of
Asia Minor. His Excellency did not seem clear what fate was contemplated for these
regions in the Paris discussions.
I said that l had imagined that, if the Turk was expelled from Constantinople, he
would be set up on a diminished throne in Asia Minor; and that for my part I would
gladly leave him in such a position, with reduced territory, diminished powers, but an
undivided sovereignty. On the other hand, it seemed to me from the reports received
from Paris that the Sick Man was not even to be left alone in the reduced quarters to
which he was to be banished. Greece was to be brought in at Smyrna, Italy at Adalia
and Konia, and France in Cilicia. The Turk was for all time to be patronised or bullied
by European Powers, and his Asiatic inheritance was to be as effectively parcelled out
as his European inheritance was to be destroyed. If these plans were pursued, I had'
some fear that, having got rid, or tried to get rid, of one Eastern problem in Europe, we
were on the verge of creating another in Asia Minor ; a prospect which filled me with
no small alarm for the future.
I am, &c.
CUBZON OF KEDLESTON.