Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎2v] (4/348)

2
it possible for Talaat, or the C.U.P., or the Young Turk party or any
Turkish Government that can be thought of, to contemplate^ going
out of the war as long as the guns of the “ Goeben mid
“Breslau” are trained upon Constantinople, tue railways and tele
graphs are in German hands, every important strategic position
in the neighbourhood of Constantinople and the Straits is
controlled bv German engineers, the Turkish army is intermixed
with German units, and is to a large extent commander by
German officers, and Germany has, as I believe she has, an
almost complete command of I urkisli finance, industry, resources,
and trade? . / u ,
But supposing that these are not facts but assumptions (though^
I doubt if our intelligence Department will dispute any one of
them), and that Turkev, in order to get out of the war and to
shake off the German yoke which she must most cordially detest, is
willing to embark upon a struggle against this embarrassing and
overpowering embrace, are we in a position to offer her e\en the
terms which I have sketched ? . •
I sav nothing of the difficulty of negotiating about Asia Minor
"without the knowledge and assent of Russia, Italy, and fiance, and
the absolute impracticability of settling the future of ( onstantinople
and the Straits behind the back of Europe—because it, may be said
that only preliminary pourparlers are in contemplation, and that
before they had gone very far our Allies could and would he taken
into consultation by us.
Neither do I dwell upon the certainty that the first overture
made through or to a Turkish intermediary would be at once made
known in Berlin ; and that clandestine agencies are the ^ery last
method of doing business with the Ottoman Turk.
But I ask how far our own pledges and commitments will
enable us to make any concession, even that of a purely ostensible
or nominal sovereignty, to the lurks m respect of the Asiatic
possessions which we have in part or in whole lopped of! from her.
Almost in the same week that we have pledged ourselves, if
successful, to secure Palestine as a national home foi tlie Jewish
people, are we to contemplate leaving the Turkish flag flying over
Jerusalem ? ....
We have committed ourselves to the liberation of Armenia.
Russia is powerless, even if she were willing, to help. Is furkey
once again to exercise a nominal sovereignty over the Armenians?
If so, their future would indeed he beyond the range of hope.
When we took Busrah the Viceroy of India promised the
inhabitants of that vilayet that it should never return to Turkish
rule. That promise at least cannot be broken.
When we took Baghdad we issued a Proclamation, approved
by the Cabinet, promising that an Arab State should be set up in
those territories, and that the lurk should disappear. that is
another promise which we cannot break.
When we instigated the Arab rising in the Hejaz, we led King
Hussein to think that not merely would he gain and keep the Hdy
Cities (he has not yet obtained possession of Medina), but that Arab
aspirations would be satisfied, and Arab independence set up in the
whole of the regions from Akaba to Damascus, and from Mecca to
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Grave, indeed, would be the consequences if the
Turkish flag were to reappear in any form whatsoever in those
regions.
If I am right with respect to these considerations, it seems to me
that we are precluded from offi ring to the Turk any solatium in the
regions which 1 have been examining, and that, so far as they are
concerned, we have to implement our promises to our frienus or
partners there before we commence to deal with the lurk, and that
even when we do the hitter, we can consent to no terms that will
not involve the permanent exclusion of these territories from Turkish
authority in any shape or form.