Miscellaneous papers on the Near and Middle East [‎30r] (59/70)

[Tills Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government]
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CONFIDENTIAL."
[ 41028 ]
No. 1.
[March 12.]
Section 1 .
Earl Curzon to Sir P Cox.
(No. 29.)
^ r ’ rpTri- -n • Ayr- • • Foreign Office, March 12, 1919.
XHft Peisian Minister asked particularly for an interview with me this afternoon.
He \\ as much concerned at my disinclination to meet Mushaver-ul-Mamalek, the
Persian Ministei for Foreign Affairs and chief member of the Persian Delegation in
l ans, who had volunteered, to come to ftngl md in order to have a talk with me on the
situation. The Persian Minister had been summoned to Paris to explain this position,
which had somewhat disconcerted the Persian representatives there, and he asked to
see me in order to enquire into its meaning.
He commence 1 ! the conversation by saying that he was almost entirely in the dark
as to what had happened in Ians, and that few communications reached him from his
own Government. He was therefore quite uncertain as to how affairs realiy stood, and
was in a quandary as to the advice which he should give to his chief in Paris. He
asked me accordingly to give hirn some idea of the line which he should take.
I said that my disinclination to meet the Persian envoy resulted from no
unwillingness to discuss the Persian question, either now or in the future. On the
^®P^. rai y> f 'welcomed the opportunity of expressing myself frankly to the Persian
Ministei here, but I did not think that it was possible to have a discussion wdth any
advantage with the Persian envoy to Paris so long as the latter was still pursuing
independent negotiations there and seeking admission to the Conference, which I
understood had so far been refused.
i he Minister tried to pin me to a statement that the Persian Government had
been encouraged by our representative in Tehran to send an envoy to Paris and had
received promises of our assistance.
Haying ti e text of our declaration on the subject with me, I was able to correct
the Minister upon this point. I reminded him that the representation of Persia at the
Peace (conference haci been over and over again stated by us as a point to be settled bv
t e Conference itself, and that all we had said was that, if a Persian representative
were.sent.and he w r eie admitted to the Conference, w r e should be glad to discuss with
him m a friendly way points of common interest to both of us. As a matter of fact,
the I ersian envoy had gone to the Conference and had issued a statement of the
Persian case, with parts of which w^e were in close agreement, but parts of which covered
a much wider field, that^ had no relation to the Conference at all; and, even while the
Minister for foreign Affairs was seeking an interview with me, and exhibiting anxietv
to come to an arrangement with us, bis Government, if I was credibly informed, were
making overtures to other foreign Powers with a view to interesting them in the
finances and administration of Persia. It did not seem to me possible for the Persian
jroveinment to ride two horses in this fashion. They could not simultaneously go to
the I eace Conference and to other Powers with a programme with parts of which we
had no sympathy, and come to me to know exactly what we were prepared to do and
how far they might rely upon us.
1 went on to say that it was for the Persian Government to settle which policy
they desired to pursue. There seemed to me to be three alternatives before them.
1 hey might endeavour to interest other Powers in their fate and fortune : a perfectly
legitimate policy, which they had often endeavoured with complete failure to carry out
m the past, and which would of course be followed by a cessation of that assistance,
financial and otherwise, which Persia now received from us, and by which alone she
was able to stand upright. Or she might go to the Peace Conference and ask that
some external Power should be appointed her mandatory : a solution which I doubted
whether her own pride would render her very eager to accept, and which any Power to
whom the charge was offered would be far from willing to adopt as soon as the financial
lespousibilities entailed were understood. Neither of these solutions seemed very likely
of attainment in view of what was passing in Paris. There appeared to be no inclina
tion to admit the Persian representatives to the Conference at all, and it was more than
likely that tliey would return without their case being heard. The third alternative
was that tne Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs should, assuming that the Paris efforts
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