'Report on the Preliminary Survey of The Route for The Central Persia Telegraph Line from Quetta to Bam and Pahra' [‎61v] (127/162)

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a syce on another. Our advance party, which started the night before, had
very great difficulty in finding Duzghi; the camels were 18 hours under their
loads wandering about, and it was more by good fortune than the guides
direction that they eventually reached the place. I too with my small party
had an anxious time coming on after them in trying to keep on their tracks.,
A slight sandstorm blew during the daywhichgraduallycovered upalltheir
footmarks, and at 4-30 P.M. we found ourselves altogether stranded. 1 halted
for half an hour, and sent off the four men with me in different directions to
try and pick up the tracks somewhere. Fortunately my servant with the
ba^age camels had anticipated our difficulty, and sent five men, the Guides,
in search of us as soon as he reached Duzghi. Had it not been for meeting
with one of these men, my party would probably have been {Delated all night.
The animals, especially the pony, were showing signs of distress for want
of water, and going a third day without getting any would have been very trying
for them, as well as for us. The prospect of becoming lost in a waterless desert
is not the ‘most pleasing subject one can think about. On arriving at Duzghi
I cross-examined the guides as to what they knew of the country further east
where we were going. I then discovered the startling fact that only one of the
six men who were supposed to be guides had ever before been to Duzghi, or any
other place south of the Koh-i-Sultan, and this one only once, many years ago ;
his knowledge was of the most hazy description. Four of the men had never
even been to Amir Chah along the trade route. Considering then my scant
equipment, I thought it best to abandon my course, and to strike noi th for the
trade route at Amir Chah. It was, I know, very foolish of me to have started
from Mirjawa without having carefully ascertained there how much, or rather
how little, the guides knew. On arriving at Amir Chah, I dismissed four of the
men, misnamed guides, and sent them back to Captain Webb Waie, informing
him at the same time by letter (copy marked C attached) that my reason for
doing so was that they were more of an encumbrance than use to my party, that
they were not guides, neither could they be considered an escort, for they were
unarmed. Had I decided to retrace my stfips from Amir Chah to Duzghi, and
carry out my original intention of keeping to the south of the Koh-i-Sultan on
my return journey to Quetta, I should have had to wait for, perhaps, to days,
or more, at Amir Chah while the local Thanadar was collecting more guides, and
would also have been placed almost on famine rations. Considering the cir
cumstances, I did not think the object worth delaying for, so I came on eastward,
as fast as I could, by the trade route track. I must explain that I did not, at
the time, attach much importance to seeing the country south of the Koh-i-Sultan.
From the information I had received, I did not expect to find a satisfactory route
there. Captain R. E. Roome, 6th Bombay Cavalry, who was exploring on
behalf of the Intelligence Department, gave me much assistance. He had seen
most of the country and knew it thoroughly. From his descriptions, I gathered
that the place was a hopeless desert, as % I have since found it to be, and that
water was met only at long distances apart, and was almost, without exception,
unfit for drinking. I was altogether ignorant of any intention to divert the trade
route that way. Had I suspected that such a diversion was likely, I would have
acted differently. I don’t know how far the Political Assistant, Chagai, contem
plated, in February 1899, diverting the trade route south of the Koh-i-Sultan ;
apparently he had in mind some idea on the subject, vide paragraph 55, Appendix
11 of his report on the development of the Baluch Persian Caravan route for
1898-99; I was not, however, informed of this at the time.
I cannot say what the composition of the men who were detailed to
accompany me from Mirjawa was intended to be, how much guide, and
how much escort, but practically there was very little of either. Only
one man could claim any pretensions to being a guide, and only one to being an
escort. One antiquated matchlock gun is not, I think, sufficient to guard a
Sahib’s party with safety travelling through any part of Western Baluchistan.
That the country I was in was not exceptionally peaceful, or settled, can be
judged from paragraph 56, Appendix II of the report on the development of the
Baluch Persian Caravan route for 1898-99, above referred to. My baggage
camels travelled mostly by night, and I by day, so that even if one gun was
sufficient for me, there was nothing left to protect my kit from becoming the prey
of any bandit on the road.