Correspondence with A J Balfour, Sir R Wingate, Lord Allenby, Lord Milner and others on Egypt [‎32r] (63/300)

to account for the violent upheaval among the agricultural classes, who take little
interest in politics and to whom the war has brought a prosperity beyond their wildest
dreams. Cotton, which realised from 18 to 25 dollars a cantar (i.00 lb.) before the war
and fell to 9^ in 1914, is now at a fixed price of 43. The British army has been
a wonderful customer. All kinds of produce—com, vegetables, fodder, &c.—fetch
excellent prices. Certainly the large notables have no ground for complaint, and it is
not believed that they are really hostile to British rule. But they are a simple and
ignorant lot, excepting in so far as agriculture is concerned, and are easily swayed by
political influences which they do not understand. With firmness and sympathy it
should not be difficult to bring them back to a saner frame of mind. I he same may be
said of the fellaheen Arabic for ‘peasant’. It was used by British officials to refer to agricultural workers or to members of a social class employed primarily in agricultural labour. , who have, for value received, always been our best friends in the
past. They have snared in a notable degree in the wave of agricultural prosperity and
they have paid off their debts to money-lenders and mortgage banks, r lhis prosperity
has given them a new feeling of independence, and they have “ waxed fat and kicked.
But it must be owned that these fellaheen Arabic for ‘peasant’. It was used by British officials to refer to agricultural workers or to members of a social class employed primarily in agricultural labour. have certain very real grievances resulting
from the war. They have bitterly resented the requisitioning of their fodder for the
army, not perhaps so much on account of the fair but fixed price, somewhat below
the market rate, as because, owing to our heavy army requirements, they have been left
short of feeding stuff* for their own cattle. But still greater resentment has been
caused bv the more or less forced requisitioning of their services for the Labour and
Camel Transport Corps in the Egypt Expeditionary Force. A hen the military
authorities demanded the assistance of an Egyptian Labour Corps it was foreseen that
trouble and ill-feeling must be created. It was not possible to secure labour by con
scription, partly because we were precluded by the terms of the Declaration of the
British Protectorate from any such action, and partly because the native Ministers and
officials all gave warning that conscription would inevitably mean widespread revolution
throughout Egypt It was absolutely necessary from a military point of view to
obtain the men, and the decision was therefore reached to recruit them as volunteers.
At first from 10,000 to 20,000 real volunteers were forthcoming. But the military
demands increased, it was urged as imperative that the Labour and transport Corns
should be maintained at a figure not far short of 100,000 men, and apart from the
congenital disinclination of the fellah Arabic for ‘peasant’. It was used by British officials to refer to agricultural workers or to members of a social class employed primarily in agricultural labour. to leave his Nile mud, conditions both of agriculture
and of agricultural labour were too good to allow of genuine voluntary enlistment on
this large scale. It was, therefore, left to the native authorities, under the supervision
of a very small body of British inspectors, to procure the men, each district having to
produce its quota. The men were enlisted for short terms of service, usually three
months; they were well paid and, it is believed, well fed and well treated. But
although a few liked the conditions of service and re-enlisted several times, the vast
majority hated being taken from their homes. Forms of compulsion had to be used,
and opportunities for corruption and favouritism were afforded, to the omdehs and minor
local officials, of which they were not slow to take advantage. No less than 500,000
men have been recruited, and although they have rendered, invaluable services to our
armies, to which General Maxwell, General Murray, and General Allenby have all
paid the highest tribute, a rankling sense of injustice and resentmefit has been lelt
among them which has, no doubt, found expression and relief in a violent campaign of
destruction, it should be added that while the behaviour of most of the British troops
quartered in the Egyptian towns and villages has been admirable, there have been
serious exceptions to this rule and very bitter feeling has been roused.
But when every allowance has been made for the state of mind and sense of
grievance depicted above, they are not sufficient to account for the present serious and
organised outbreak, in which the hand of the Young Turk, and even German agent, is
clearly discernible. There is a significant reference in a telegram from General Allenby,
of* the 4th April, to the “fanatical resentment against the Armenians. ’ Ihere has never
been any such resentment felt by Egyptians except under Young Turk instigation. As
has already been indicated, the plan of campaign followed was that laid down for
1914. Very little illuminating information has been received from official sources
in Cairo, but a number of British officers and residents have arrived here during
the last few days who throw fresh light on the inside working of the revolt.
Reference has already been made to the organisation in the towns and to the
attacks on communications. In the outlying districts small bands of, agitators
appeared at the provincial headquarters and summoned the “ Mamur, ’ or head
administrative official, to hoist the new Egyptian flag and join in the movement
fbr “ Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.” When, as happened in nearly every
c aS e y the Mamur refused, the Nationalists threatened that they would bring