Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎211v] (422/442)

Persia.
Persia.
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[LORDS]
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escorts away. I quite agree with what the
noble Marquess said on the point of military
occupation. There is not a sane man in
this country who would welcome an
occupation either on a large or a small scale
by British forces of any part of Southern
Persia. It is precisely because we think
the attitude now adopted must inevitably
lead sooner or later to some such occupation
that we feel bound from time to time to call
attention in this House to matters as they
progress. Such, my Lords, is the state of
affairs in the North, the centre, and the
South of Persia.
There is one other point of view that even
we in your Lordships’ House ought to
consider, and that is the position and
sufferings of the Persian people themselves.
I believe the attitude of that unhappy
people, torn by this disorder, is one of
profound misery, so much so that they
would welcome any strong hand that was
stretched out over them, whether it were
Russian, or British, or foreign of any
description whatever. That, my Lords, is
an element that may appeal to our pity,
but it is also an element of danger ; because,
of course, the knowledge of such a condition
of affairs can hardly fail to be an encourage
ment to the extreme persons on the Russian
side who are anxious to push their Govern
ment into a further advance.
Broadly speaking, although the noble
Marquess deprecated the use of strong ad
jectives, he said little to dispute the picture
which the noble Lord behind me drew and
some of the details of which I have filled in.
But in one portion of his speech the noble
Marquess indulged in the now familiar retort,
familiar because we have not only heard it
in this House but the Foreign Secretary
has repeated it almost ad nauseam in the
House of Commons—namely, that bad as
this condition of affairs is it would have
been much worse but for the Anglo-Russian
Agreement. The way in which the noble
Marquess put it this evening was this, that
owing to the Convention we had escaped a
definite occupation by Russia of the northern
part of Persia. The facts that I gave just
now, I think, show that the position of
affairs is little short of a definite occupation
of that part of the country by Russia.
The general argument used by the noble
Marquess and employed by the Foreign
Secretary is one which it seems to me is
quite inconsistent with the facts of the case ;
and for this reason more than for any other.
Karl Curzon of Kedleston.
The Anglo-Russian Agreement was con
cluded in September, 1907—that is to say,
nearly five years ago. But what was the
position of affairs in Persia before those
days ? For nearly a hundred years the
position of Russia in the North has been one
of military ascendancy in strength almost as
great as that she now occupies. Yet during
the whole of this time, although there was no
Anglo-Russian Agreement, Persia retained
her independence. None of these calami
tous results ensued. But since the con
clusion of that Agreement—I do not say
entirely in consequence of it—the position
of Persia has been steadily and dailv
getting worse. To what was it due that in
the old days Persia succeeded in retaining
her integrity and independence without the
Anglo-Russian Agreement to sustain her ?
It was due to the consciousness that had
any attempt been made by Russia or by
any other Power to destroy that integrity
or to interfere with that independence,
such an act would have been met by the
determined hostility of this country. That
has been the traditional policy of British
Governments for the best part of the last
century. Why is the opposite result
produced now ? It is because our attitude
in Persia, at the same time that we repeat
our old assurances about independence and
integrity, is no longer one of determined
insistence upon the principles to which I
refer, but is apt to be one of complacency,
of acquiescence, of mild-mannered agree
ment in the various infringements that take
place of Persian autonomy, which one may
almost say is being whittled away before
our very eyes.
The noble Marquess seemed to think that
perhaps the worst thing that could happen
in the matter of Persia—it would, indeed,
be a bad one—would be that we should be
driven at any time to contemplate a military
occupation of the southern part of the
country. True. But let us try and look
a little bit ahead. Let us try and see the
airection in which things are tending. It
seems to me that if the present state of
affairs continues, if Russia is driven by the
exigencies of the case to tighten her hold,
first upon the North and then upon the
centre of the country, she must gradually
move down towards our sphere and must
fill the vacuum which is created by the
incompetence of the Persian Government.
And in this way I do see—it is a prophecy
and warning which I utter with profound
regret—a drawing together of the Russian