Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎208r] (415/442)

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Persia.
Persia.
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[24 July 1912]
also was any idea that we should give I
support to the Persian Government should
Mohamed AH return again to Persia. That
is an instance of how the position that was
taken up with great fairness at so late a
date as January 17 has been whittled
away.
fn this connection I should like to obtain
a definite answer on the point whether
His Majesty’s Government still adhere to
what was said in this House by Lord
Morley in December last. The noble
Viscount then said—
“ Whatever intrigues may have gone on between
the ex-Shah and the subordinate agents of the
Russian Government, they do not affect the desire,
the intention, of the Russian Government not to
support the ex-Shah if he should attempt to return
to his Throne, and we for our part have informed
the Russian Government that it would be impossible
for us under any circumstances whatever to recog
nise the ex-Shah.”
It is highly desirable to obtain some definite
answer on this point, because the greatest
fear is felt in Persia at the present time that
th^e ex-Shah may return, that if he did there
would possibly be a series of terrible
reprisals, and also that he would be a
mere puppet in the hands of the Russian
Government.
There is one other instance of where His
Majesty’s Government have very readily
acquiesced in Russian action, and that is
with regard to the garrison that is kept at
Kazvin. On December 27 our Ambassador
at St. Petersburg said that M. Sazonoff was
quite prepared to withdraw the troops from
Kazvin as soon as the conditions of the
Ultimatum that was then being presented
to the Persian Government were complied
with. There was a subsequent Despatch
which admitted that these conditions had
been fully complied with ; but the garrison
at Kazvin was not withdrawn. His
Majesty’s Government from time to time
made representations about its continued
stay there, particularly at the time when
the ex-Shah left Persia, but the garrison of
at least 1,000 men was still at Kazvin in
May, and there is no reason to believe that
it is not there at the present moment.
I quote these instances as showing that His
Majesty’s Government have been more
than complaisant, that they have been only
too ready to sacrifice the independence of
Persian interests. The whole of the Blue-
book shows what a farce it is to talk of
there being any freedom of action on the
’ part of the Persian Government. One of
the conditions of the loan of £ 200,000 to
Persia was that Persia should recognise
fully the Anglo-Russian Convention.
Hitherto they have always been opposed to
any such recognition, because they deemed
the Convention to be an infringement of
their sovereign powers. However much
they resisted it, they finally had to give
their agreement to the Convention, and in
doing so I think they sealed the fact that
they were no longer an independent
Power.
Perhaps I am rather flogging a dead horse
in dwelling upon the independence of
Persia, because in the House of Commons in
December last we had an admission by
Sir Edward Grey which seemed to me to give
the whole case away. At that time he said,
in reference to the Anglo-Russian Agree
ment—
“ It was -never intended by the Agreement to
destroy or diminish Russian influence in any part
of Asia where it had already been obtained. The
object of the Agreement was not to thrust Russia
back, and, of course, not to deprive ourselves of
any influence we had at the time in Asia. Russian
influence when the Anglo-Russian Agreement was
made was already predominant in the North of
Persia.”
A perfect state of stagnation does not
exist, and it was not likely, if Russian
influence was not to decline, that matters
would remain exactly as they were at the
time of the signing of the Convention.
There was bound to be an advance towards
an extension of the interests of Russia and
possibly of ourselves. Therefore if it was
the intention of His Majesty’s Government
at that time that there was to be no decline
of the interests or of the influence of the
two Powers in Persia, it was perfectly
inconsistent to make any reference in the
Convention to “ the independence and
integrity ” of Persia. On February 8
Sir Edward Grey said, in a Despatch, that
the Persian Government was deserving now
of the support of His Majesty’s Government
because they had got rid of those members
who were unfavourable to the continuance
of Russian influence in Northern Persia.
That is really the whole case against the
Mejliss. What these people were fighting
for was simply the ordinary independence
of their country and for freedom of action.
But this was held to be a reproach, and not
until the Mejliss was, by a coup d'etat,
dissolved and some members of the Govern
ment who were supposed to hold strongly
Nationalist views were dismissed did His