Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎199v] (398/442)

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The Trans-Persian Railway. [ LORDS ] The Trans-Persian Railway.
be inclined to prefer. I wish they would railway and the Anglo-Russian Convention
realise the difficulties of trade in Persia—
insecurity, inefficient and corrupt adminis
tration, maladministration of justice, the
great distance between giving an order and
its execution, the l<?ng delay of exchange
remittances, the impossibility of super
vising and controlling mercantile transac
tions—all these difficulties will be lessened
by improved communications. They will
yield to improved communications, and
they are very little likely to yield to any
thing else. If I may venture upon a
private observation I am not at all sure
that those are not right who, instead of
railways, recommend,, not caravan roads,
but cart roads, as they would be less
expensive, and so forth. But that is a
question that I have no right to go into
to-night. Supposing circumstances com
pelled the Government of the day, whoever
they may be, to adopt the railway policy
the precedents are not quite encouraging.
Though the overland route from London
to Constantinople competes with the sea
route, the latter suffers no disadvantage
at all in consequence of this competing
land route. Then we have been told a
great deal during the discussions about the
Siberian Railway. I rather think that
some of the Russian advocates of this line
have pointed to the Siberian railway.
There is no real parallel at all.
*Earl CURZON of KEDLESTON :
Hear, hear.
Viscount MORLEY: I am glad the
noble Earl agrees, because there is no real
parallel at all between the Siberian railway
and this Trans-Persian railway. The
Siberian railway shortens the distance
from the centre of Europe to the Far East
by one-half. Then it gives a direct rail
way route much shorter than the sea
route, not merely to India, but to an area
infinitely larger in size than India, com
prising as well the important seaports
of China and of Japan. The only other
observation I make about the Siberian
railroad is that on that there is an immense
emigration traffic. On the Trans-Persian
line there is no reason to suppose that there
will be any emigration traffic at all. I
I was disappointed, I admit, at what the
noble Earl said about the effect of this line
upon Persia. I do not suppose for a
moment that this line or any other line
or any number of them would bring the
millennium to Persia. The confusion in
Persia along with the advent of the Baghdad
Viscount Morley.
are the elements that have made this
proposal actual. As to the effect upon the
confusion of Persia one thing is certain,
and will not be denied by anybody who
has any idea of government in any part
of the world and who is at all acquainted
with—shall I call it—the chaos that
exists in many parts of Persia—namely,
that railways would immenselv increase
the power of the Persian Government
in dealing with disorder and maintaining
something a little more like security. I
saw the other day some emphatic language
of a very competent observer who knows
Persia well. He says that to introduce
railways, including this trunk line, would
be to put the most powerful weapon into
the hands of the Central Government in
Persia, which is to-day a mere shadow and
can be derided with impunity. I was
surprised that some political friends of
mine who are so anxious that we should be
more active on the popular side of affairs
in Persia should be the most indignant of
all at the idea of a measure which would
do more than any other, if it were financially
workable and so forth, to put into the hands
of the Persian Government the power of
managing their own affairs and holding up
their heads, in the language of my friends,
against both Russia and England.
I will not detain your Lordships longer.
The whole question of the alignment and
the terms on which the railroad is to be
administered and controlled, the question
of whether the profits made on the northern
lines ought to be pooled with the profits
made in the south, a much more dubious
quantity—all these are matters which this
House and the other House and the country
can consider much more effectively when
they have a definite scheme presented to
them. It is said, “You have never con
sulted Persia.” It will be quite time
enough to consult Persia as to a concession
when w r e and the other Powers concerned
have made up our minds as to what is the
concession we ought to ask for. Let us
then make up our minds what is the best
alignment and what all these other sub
sidiary arrangements ought to be. The
noble Earl, I hope, will not think that I
have at all shirked the important dis
cussion that he raised about the alignment
of the route. He will understand that
some of those projected routes involve
considerations of extreme danger, and
therefore I have not thought it worth while'