Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎195v] (390/442)

461 The Trans-Persian Pail way. [ LORDS ] The Trans-Persian Railway. 462
properly claim that title with regard to this
question who is in favour of the Trans-
Persian scheme. In the debate in the
House of Commons last week not a single
speaker on either side of the House gave
it anything like a whole-hearted support.
In fact, I think every speaker who alluded
to it was against it. There are some
newspapers which ordinarily support His
Majesty’s Government with unswerving
fidelity—for instance, the Manchester
Guardian —which are strenuously hostile
to this proposal, on the perfectly worthy
ground that it conflicts with all the ideas
they have always entertained as to the
principles of Indian frontier defence. Then
we come to the military authorities. 1 can
only speak for those wdiom I have come
across, but among them there has not been
a dissentient voice ; and I dare say your
Lordships may have noticed that there
have been during the past few days two
letters in The Times by a military authority
who certainly speaks with great ability and
with great weight and to whom His
Majesty’s Government are indebted for
many kind acts of written support—I
mean the Military Correspondent of The
Times, Colonel Repington. Last week
he had a letter in The Times of which I
wflll only read one paragraph, because it
really contains the objections entertained
by many people to this railway in a very
convincing w r ay—
“My opinion is that this scheme, if carried out,
will gravely alter the conditions under which
India must be defended; will enable external
pressure to be applied to India and will therefore
be politically unacceptable; will not materially
benefit Persia nor British and Indian interests in
Persia, except by affording a quicker route for
mails ; will divert mails and some passengers from
the sea to the land route through Germany and
will correspondingly injure our maritime carrying
trade and industries ; will reduce the profits which
the public derives from the Suez Canal; will pro-
bably burden the finances of England or India or
both ; and, while being of no conceivable military
service to us in any circumstances that can be
foreseen, may in certain contingencies aggravate
the military risks of India, increase the front which
the Army in India has to defend with relatively
weak forces, inflate expenditure upon defence, and
render India more liable to foreign aggression
by depriving her of the shield of her desert
frontiers.”
That argument has been reinforced by
the same writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. in another and longer
letter which many of your Lordships may
have read in The Times of this morning ;
and I must say this, that to the criticisms
to which I am referring no answer whatever
has yet been given either by Sir Edward
Earl Curzon of Kedleston.
Grey in the House of Commons or by any
other spokesman of His Majesty’s Govern
ment.
You will expect me, perhaps, to examine
a little more closely these various points—
namely, the manner in which this railway,
if built, will affect the security of India,
will affect our communication with India,
will affect Anglo-Indian trade with Persia,
and will affect the security of Persia itself.
First let me take the defence of India.
I imagine that it would be true to say that
the history of the frontier defences of
India during the last hundred years has,
broadly speaking, passed through twophases.
First there was the time in which the
Government of India were spreading their
conquests over the level plains of India
until they came up to the mighty barrier
of the mountains, which stand like an
artificial palisade around our borders.
Sometimes, of course, as in the case of the
first Afghan War, we were tempted to cross
that barrier, but usually to our detriment.
Then came the period, beginning about
fifty years ago, when either because of
the depredations of the tribes in the
mountains or the existence of hostile
and intriguing influences beyond we were
driven forward in search of what used to
be called a “ scientific frontier.” The
consequences of those forward movements
pursued over a wide circumference were
these. In parts we took completely into
qur own hands the country beyond the
palisade ; such was the case with Balu
chistan ; elsewhere we put the mountain
passes in charge of Militia levies, or military
police raised from the tribes themselves,
and we gave subsidies to the tribes ; and
as regards the countries beyond we con
trived, by treaties or other arrangements,
to protect or guarantee or neutralise the
whole of the surrounding kingdoms to
which I refer. Such was the case with
regard to Persia, to Afghanistan, to Tibet,
and, more in the East, Siam. But the
whole point throughout in both these phases
has been this, that India ought to be
surrounded for the purpose of safety by
a belt, be it of mountains or be it of desert,
which it would be difficult to cross. You
really may compare the position to that
of a fortress with a great glacis stretch
ing around it, cleared by the treaties
and political arrangements which have
been made, and swept by our guns. The
theory has always been that no one should
be at liberty to advance across that glacis