Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎186v] (372/442)

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The Trans-
[LORDS]
Persian Railway.
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Lord, for he will see that matters have |
been moving slowly, a fact which I gather
he will not deeply regret. But we also bear
in mind the important point which was
mentioned by my noble friend on the Cross
Benches—namely, that if railway con
struction is going to take place in Northern
Persia, railway construction must take
place also in Southern Persia unless our
particular interests are to suffer. That
is a fact which we steadily bear in mind.
As noble Lords know very well, the mere
raising of money for enterprises such as
this in a country in which the future is
unluckily as unsettled and as uncertain as
that of Persia is, is no easy matter, and
therefore it cannot be expected that things
will proceed with lightning speed.
Speculators do not rush forward for enter
prises of this kind, although I hope that
it will be found that there is a prospect
of a reasonable and solid return for capital
invested in railway enterprise in Persia.
I can assure my two noble friends who
are specially interested that we are
keeping a close watch on the subject,
both the Foreign Office and the Depart
ment over which I preside, and that
if later on there is more information I
can give them it will be a pleasure for me
to do so.
Lord LAMINGTON : Could the noble
Marquess say anything about the opinion
of the Government of India on the effect
of this Trans-Persian railway ? Sir Edward
Grey said the Foreign Office were in close
communication with the Government of
India, and I should like to know what
their opinion is.
The Marquess of CREWE : I think I
can answer that question, although
probably not entirely to the noble Lord’s
satisfaction. So far as the opinion of the
Government of India is concerned as to
the making of this railway, the need of
consulting their opinion especially rests,
in fact almost entirely, on the question of
Indian defence. Two years ago when we
discussed this matter I mentioned that
the General Staff in India had been con
sulted and had given an opinion on the
question of alignment. I remember that
the noble Earl, who is not here to-day,
Lord Curzon, rather objected to my
reference to the General Staff. He said
that in his day the only opinion considered
The Marquess of Crewe.
by any one was that of the Government
of India. Technically I have no doubt
that the noble Earl was right, and I
ought not, perhaps, to have mentioned
military opinion. At the same time
I cannot help remembering how in home
matters, when we express an opinion
as a Government on some question of
national defence, we are perpetually
questioned by noble Lords opposite as
to whether the military or naval advisers
of the Government agree in the view;
and I think I recollect cases where
we have been asked to supply the
opinions, if we could, of individual officers.
Therefore I cannot feel that in mentioning
the opinion of the General Staff I erred
greatly.
I think it was cleared up to some extent
on the occasion of our last debate that the
only kind of alignment to which the
military authorities in India would agree
was a coastal alignment. Supposing the
railway, that is, the line from Persia into
India towards Karachi, is along the coast,
there must be a possibility of using our naval
superiority for the purpose of defending
that line of railway. That has been
generally agreed. The noble Lord will
not expect me, because it is of a confi
dential character, to go into the merits or
demerits from a military view of align
ment within Persia itself. I am afraid,
therefore, it is impossible to lay any Papers
on the subject, because the whole matter,
as the noble Lord well understands, is
of a purely confidential character; but
I shall be happy to give him any confi
dential information which I properly
can with regard to the views of the Govern
ment of India on the subject. The noble
Lord mentioned that it had been stated
that in certain events an increase of the
defensive forces in India might be made
necessary by the construction of the
railway. It is difficult to imagine a
Government of India, still more difficult
I think to imagine a Government here,
which would agree to the construction of
a line which involved a large increase in
the Army in India ; and in considering
the question of alignment it has, of
course, been borne in mind that the only
ultimate alignment for access to India
to which we could willingly agree would
be an alignment which would not in
volve a substantial increase in the Indian
Army.