Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎156r] (311/442)

1983 Supply (Committee).
Foreign Office. 1984
10 July 1912
and beneficent factor in keeping the peace
in the Far East and preventing all the dis
turbances which have taken place in China,
which are due to internal causes, from
giving rise to international apprehension
between the Powers which are interested.
I have said that, because I think it is some
thing which ought to be borne in mind.
I come to the Mediterranean question.
The hon. Member asked me
8.0 p.m. very detailed questions, which
can only be answered on the
Naval Estimates. He asked me about the
opinion of the previous Inspector-General
of the Forces, and a great many questions
which obviously I cannot answer. But I
do not wish to avoid the main issue. He
spoke of the reduction of our force in the
Mediterranean. At present I have no hesi
tation in saying that we either have a
sufficient force in the Mediterranean, or
could put into the Mediterranean at very
short notice a sufficient force to meet any
■ emergency which might arise. Therefore
we have not incurred any peril at present.
But I do not think that was really the
point that he was most anxious about in
his own mind. He was thinking rather of
future naval policy. Are we going really
to abandon a position which will put us
in a state in which we cannot protect our
interests l I quite agree that if we did
anything like abandoning the Mediterra
nean you could not make our position there
a secure one by any skilful diplomacy or
foreign policy. On the other hand, it cer
tainly is not necessary that we should keep
a force in the Mediterranean which is to
be able at all moments to hold its own
against all the other fleets which may be
there. But I admit, if we abandon the
Mediterranean altogether, though at pre
sent we have no prospect of any quarrel
with the Powers in the Mediterranean, and
though I do not think there is a single
Power in the Mediterranean at this
moment which is contemplating in its own
mind hostile or prejudicial designs against
us, there would be a tendency for us to
be left out of account, to slip out of ac
count, and, do what you might in foreign
policy, the diplomatic situation would
harden against you. Therefore, I admit,
that we want to keep a sufficient naval
force available for use in the Mediterra
nean at any moment to count as one of the
Mediterranean Naval Powers. I cannot
go into the question of exactly what that
would require, but we ought to count as
one of the Mediterranean Naval Powers by
a force which is available for use in the
Mediterranean at any moment. Of course,
that leaves out of account what force in an
emergency you might be able to put into
the Mediterranean from other places. I
want to make that point clear. To count
as one of the Mediterranean naval Powers
you must have some respectable force in
the Mediterranean which is available for
use at any time. Further than that, I do
not think I can take it to-night, but, any
how, that may serve as the preface to the
Debate which is to come, either on the
Committee of Defence Vote or the Naval
Vote, on the Mediterranean question.
I think I have been over really all the
points which were raised. I do not want
to go into large questions of general
foreign policy unnecessarily. I would only
like to repeat generally what I have said
before, that our foreign policy remains un
changed. The starting point of any new
development in European foreign policy is
the maintenance of our friendship with
France and Russia. Taking that as our
starting point, let us have the best possible
relations with other countries, and when
we see either France or Russia coming to
an agreement with another great Euro
pean Power and being on good terms with
it, as was emphasised by the meeting be
tween the Russian and German Emperors
the other day, we have every reason to
congratulate ourselves. We are perfectly
convinced that France and Russia are as
desirous of friendship with us as we are
desirous of friendship with them. Nothing
which takes place on occasions such as the
meeting in the Baltic the other day is
going to take place to our disadvantage,
and. just as if anything makes difficulties
between France and Germany or between
Russia and Germany, so that is going to
exercise a disturbing influence upon diplo
matic relations betw r een ourselves and
Germany, or anything which removes diffi
culties out of the path between France and
Germany or between Germany and Russia,
as the Morocco settlement did last year,
and as the conversation between Russia
and Germany may have done at Potsdam
or in the Baltic, that smooths the path of
the relations between us and Germany too.
There was a very significant statement in
an official communique published after
the meeting of the Russian and German
Emperors the other day, wffiich contained
this sentence:—
“ There could be no question either of new agree
ments, because there was no particular occasion for
them, or of producing alterations of any kind in the
grouping of the European Powers, the value of which
for the maintenance of peace has already been proved.”
I entirely endorse that. I have always
felt that though there may be separate