Middle East Committee and Eastern Committee [‎8v] (16/42)

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On the other hand, he felt hound to point out to the Committee
that the proposed concession raised a question of high policy, viz.,
- Was it either possible or desirable that His Majesty s Government
should take any immediate step which assumed continued British
occupation of Baghdad after the War ? ” The fact that the future ot
Mesopotamia lay on the lap of the Peace Conference rendered it
hardly possible, even if desirable, that His Majesty’s Government
should give monopoly rights to a British firm now. Further, m t ie
event of questions arising in Parliament, it would be difficult to
reconcile the proposed action with the war aims of the Allies as
stated by the Prime Minister and President Wilson. The view
might be expressed that we were prosecuting the war lor British
capitalistic expansion. He also understood that Sir Percy Cox,
while.he was anxious that immediate steps should be taken to open
up trade and banking facilities in Mesopotamia, was opposed to the
creation of a monopoly. Sir Percy Cox was now on his way to Cairo
to discuss these and" other questions with a representative of tne
India Oifice, and he therefore thought that it would be premature to
give any undertaking or enter into any arrangement wim Lon
Inckcape, pending the receipt of the report from the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors.
representative regarding his conversation with Sir Percy C ox.
Lord Hardinge stated that the Foreign Office attached special
importance to the opening up of banking operations in Mesopotamia.
The Ottoman Bank at Baghdad was now closed, and such banking
operations as were now being conducted were being carried out by
the Eastern Bank Company, of which Lord Balfour of Burleigh was
chairman, which hank had entered the field at the Governments
invitation. i i ir r ±1
Mr. Parker, who had assisted Lord Inchcape on behalt ot t ic
Foreign Office, stated that the Inchcape navigation concession
formed one of a set of twenty-two agreements negotiated in 1913
and 1914, two of which had been actually ratified, and all of which
had been initialled. 1
The present proposal of Lord Inchcape amounted to a monopoiv
of river navigation rights on the Tigris and Euphrates, hut not to
a monopoly of banking. , ,,
Mr. Parker expressed his strong personal conviction that the
sole effective means of preventing the capture by Germany or Japan
of the river navigation, and the sole practical means of competing
against foreign subsidies, was a well-controlled > monopoly (with
proper safeguards as to rates and services) under British management.
He mentioned that 50 per cent, of the original share capital m
Lord Inchcape s Company was placed at the disposal ot the Ottoman
Government, and this share might now he transferred to the new
Government, whatever that might Vie, in Mesopotamia. I his would
give that Government a large interest in the monopoly. As regards
rianking, all that Lord Inchcape asked for was facilities to start
operations, us soon as possible, at Baghdad. His idea was to promote
a large banking syndicate to compete against such institutions as
the Ueutsche Bank. . „ .
Having talked to Sir John Jackson regarding the control ol the
Tigris, Mr. Parker gathered that Sir John Jackson took the view
that navigation and irrigation in Mesopotamia were not necessarily
conflicting, as contended by Sir W. Willcocks.
Sir John Jackson also thought that, in view of the present
wasteful irrigation methods of the Arabs, with more modern methods
there would be no difficulty in providing enough water both for
irrigation and navigation purposes.
Mr. Balfour did not share this view; he thought that the
interests of navigation and irrigation were always like to be
coincident. He agreed that the conservancy of the Liver Tigris
should be placed under one authority, hut doubted whether tins
authority could be vested in a commercial firm or syndicate.
General Macdonogh stated that it is most desirable that sue
steps should be taken as were consistent with military exigencies as