Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎143v] (286/290)

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the political control of the Government of India or the India
Office. That Department had been proceeding on this assump
tion. With regard to the Sultans of Mokalla, Lahej and
Socotra, these chieftains had always been dealt with by Aden,
and the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. had assumed that, with the transfer of
the political control of Aden, these chieftains would similarly
be transferred. The reason why the Government of India
were now suggesting that they should retain control over the
Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , including Muscat, was that the
decision of 1917 had been taken on the assumption that His
Majesty’s Government would be in a strong administrative position
in Mesopotamia. As a result of recent developments and the trend
of our policy towards the eventual independence of an Arab
Mesopotamia the Government of India were inclined to the view
that, so far as the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. was concerned, the 1917 decision
should be reconsidered.
The Chairman said that personally he was inclined to share the
apprehensions of the Government of India. It was not quite clear
to him how a Department in London could be expected to control
the scattered chieftains of South-East Arabia.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that His Majesty’s Government
would always retain representatives at Jerusalem, Baghdad, Cairo,
and Aden, and he presumed that these representatives would come
directly under the control of the proposed Middle Eastern Depart
ment. The exact method by which this control should be exercised
would be for the new Department to consider.
The Chairman alluded to the difficulties in the way of the
formation of a Middle Eastern service in view of the fact that His
Majesty’s Government appeared to be contemplating a gradually
diminishing connection with the Middle Eastern countries He
agreed, however, with Mr. Montagu that some in >re satisfactory
arrangement must be made to secure the services of those British
officers who were employed on these countries.
Mr. Chamberlain said that at the time when His Majesty’s
Government were paying subsidies to the King of the Hedjaz and
to Feisal, two points had arisen which caused him considerable
anxiety. One was that His Majesty’s Government were subsidising
Arabian rulers who were hostile to each other. The other was the
impression that he had gathered from various telegrams that
Hussein and Feisal were making use of their subsidies to promote
attacks against our allies, the French. He did not know whether
Hussein and Feisal were still as strongly anti-French as they had
been at that time, but he thought that this aspect of the subsidy
question should be carefully considered. It appeared to him that
the only Arab ruler who had given His Majesty’s Government no
trouble during the last two or three years was I bn Rashid, who had
never received any financial support at all.
The Chairman did not consider that the danger of subsidised
chieftains fighting each other was an argument against their being
subsidised. On the contrary, the payment of subsidies was in his
opinion the only way to control them at all. it continually happened
on the north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. that relations between subsidisetl chiefs
became strained. When this happened, the threat that the subsidy
would be withdrawn was nearly always successful in restraining the
activities of the ruler who was behaving badly. With regard to the
danger of Hussein taking anti-French action, he pointed out that the
proposal in paragraph 21 of the Foreign Office Memorandum was
that financial support to King Hussein should be made conditional
on his giving certain definite undertakings. One of these would
of course be that he should refrain from anti-Allied action. He sug
gested, for the consideration of the Conference, that the principle
should be accepted that His Majesty’s Government and the Govern
ment of India should contribute in equal 'shares to financial