Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎139v] (278/290)

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this effect. It was practicable to consider Sir Percy Cox’s tnking
over immediately or, alternatively, his remaining in Baghdad for a
short time. He did not wish to anticipate the Chairman’s recommen
dation to the Conference on this point. In addition to the question
of personnel, he thought the Conference should carefully consider the
terrible events at Tel Afar.
The possible effect of refusing to allow Colonel Wilson to send
his proposed deputation must not be lost sight of. A similar refusal
m the case of Egypt had caused serious outbreaks in that country.
Provided that no similar local outbreak was to be anticipated, he
was of opinion that it would be better for Sir Percy Cox to give all
classes an opportunity of laying their views before him in Baghdad
immediately. He would even include those Baghdadis who were
not at present in Mesopotamia. The best way to avoid the
recrudescence of attacks on our frontier was to go to the fountain
head. He considered that this procedure was in every way
preferable to that recently suggested by the War Office, which was
that Jeziret Ibn Omar and Dair-az-Zor should be bombed.
His reasons for requesting the Chairman to call a meeting of
t le Conference were that he was anxious for them to discuss the
question of the announcement, and he also wished to know how far
the Conference agreed with the action that he had taken.
The Chairman remarked that a Cabinet Conference was to be
held on the following day to discuss the whole Middle-Eastern
question In view of the fact that these telegrams had been
circulated to the Cabinet, it was clearly impossible for the Conference
to arrive at a definite decision. So far as Mesopotamia was
concerned, the question to be decided at the Cabinet Conference was
whether we were to remain in Mesopotamia or not. He understood
t e recent fipod of War Office papers to be directed towards a policy
of evacuation. J
dir John i dley said that the same policy was bein^' pursued bv
the AN ar Office throughout the Middle East, and not only in
Mesopotamia and Palestine.
Mr. Montagu said that if the Cabinet decided that we were to
evacuate Mesopotamia the proposed announcement would of course
, t '! e g 1 ' oun 4- If. on the other hand, they decided to stay’
the Conference might suitably discuss the measures which would
then be desirable.
The Chairman assented. He said that he entirely concurred in
Mr. Montagus suggestion that Sir Percy Cox should consult all
classes. there should be no privacy or secrecy at all about his
ai rival in Mesopotamia. The announcement that he was to be the
j . High (commissioner should be made immediately, subiect to the
decision of the Cabinet Conference on the following day He also
concurred in the proposal that the Baghdadis who were not in the
country should be given an opportunity of explaining what they
wanted, no matter how extreme their views might be. The Milner
extremists' ^TV 8 hT t0 ^ ^ . V ‘ ews of the Egyptian
extremists. They had not succeeded in inducing them to state
their case while they were m Egypt, but they had now come to
antved at am ^ 10,>ed that U satis,a ^ory solution would be
There appeared to him to be two alternatives before the Con
ference : either to instruct Sir Percy Cox to remain in Mesopotamia'
or to allow him to come home to consult His Majesty’s'Government
before taking uo Ins post. The objections to the first of these
alternatives were: firstly, that he was a tired man and it w!*
hardly fair to ask him to remain in Baghdad during the hot
weather without a period of leave; secondly, that the tefms of the
mandate had n..t been finally decided - and thirdly tn t * 1
not quite sure that he knew what our po’li^wafto M a^ed