Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎128v] (256/290)

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The position at Tabriz was also disquieting. The British force
there consisted of only two platoons, and was in a precarious position.
They were threatened from the direction of Astara by a numerically
superior force of Cossacks in Tabriz itself. If Tabriz went, Persian
Azerbaijan, the present Persian Ministry, and with them the Anglo-
Persian Agreement, would also go.
Simultaneously the position was acute in the Caucasus States.
The degree of Bolshevik pem tration was not clear, but Azerbaijan
appeared to be in the hollow of their hands. The new Govern
ment at Erivan was rather inexplicably said by Commander Luke
to be more hostile to the Bolsheviks than the late Government.
In any case, it seemed not to have been proved that the Armenian
Bepublic had gone over to the Bolsheviks, though there appeared
to be a chance of this happening in the near future. The news
from Georgia was conflicting, and he only mentioned the situation
in the Caucasus on account of its reflex influence on the Persian
situation.
Turning again to the Persian situation, there was the rather
uncomfortable element of Starosselski. The distribution of the
Russian Cossack forces in Persia at the time when the General Staff
memorandum was written was as follows :—
At Tabriz ... 700 rifles and sabres.
At Astara ... 250 rifles and sabres.
At Teheran ... A,500 rifles and sabres and 12 guns.
At Hamadan... 780 rifles.
Between Hamadan and Ispahan, 500 rifles and
sabres and 4 guns.
©
Starosselski, as the Conference were aware, was playing the old
Russian game. He was out to recover Russia’s old position in
Persia. Three points were especially noteworthy :—
(a.) That having 1,500 rides and sabres and 12 guns at Teheran,
he was local master of the situation.
(b.) That he was said to have th$ Shah behind him.
(c.) That we had not actually broken with him ; we had even
been continuing payment of his subsidy until quite
recently.
Two alternatives had been considered by the authorities on the
spot:—Firstly, to arrest and deport Starosselski and his Russian
officers and to disarm the Cossack division temporarily, accepting
such risks as might result from the liberation of the Cossack detach
ments in the provinces. Secondly, to await the arrival of the Shah,
and meanwhile to inform Starosselski that the British subsidy would
be discontinued in view of the Commission’s report; that he must
reduce his numbers accordingly ; and that the precise manner of
incorporation of the Cossack division and the South Persia rifles
into a new uniform force would be discussed in due course.
So far as pressure could be exercised on the Shah while he was
in Europe, this had been done. His return to Persia, for which he
had strongly pressed, had been made conditional on his supporting
Vossugh, adhering strictly to the Anglo-Persian Agreement
and dealing firmly with Starosselski. It would be unwise to expect
too much from the undertakings that he had given, but at any rate
something had been done. With regard to our own forces the
Conference had decided at the last meeting, on the advice of the
War Office, to retain the detachment at Enzeli as a bluff. The
General Officer Commanding, Norperforce, reported that, while he
considered himself secure at Enzeli from direct attack either by land or
by sea, a Russian advance from Astara against his lines of communica
tion would oblige him to fall back. The War Office recommended
the withdrawal of the Enzeli and Tabriz detachments to Kas-
vin. The Persian Prime Minister had agreed to this course