Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎121v] (242/290)

Office and Admiralty, who had agreed upon the terms offered in the
War Office telegram of the 17th February, in which he believed that
the Foreign Office had concurred.
The Chairman did not remember that the Foreign Office had
been consulted before this telegram was sent. The cost and trouble
of repatriating these crews, and probably the refugees also, appeared
certain to fall upon His Majesty’s Government. He did not under
stand why His Majesty’s Government should commit themselves to
making these arrangements, nor did he agree that repatriation was
part and parcel of the policy of supporting Denikin. It had only
been wedged into this policy by Mr. Mackinder’s unauthorised pledge
as regards the Black Sea area. Even if the War Office telegram of
the 17th February committed His Majesty’s Government to
repatriating the officers and crews, it did not commit them to
repatriating the refugees. (At this point Mr. Montagu entered.)
Not only would transport difficulties be very great, but the Persian
Government and Sir Percy Cox both objected strongly to these
Russians entering Persia.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that if His Majesty’s Government
were pledged to repatriate the 1,400 officers and men, the repatria
tion of the additional 600 refugees would not make a very great
difference. It seemed to him rather hard to tell a married officer,
who was fleeing with his wife and family from the Bolsheviks, that
he would be repatriated, but that his family must make their own
arrangements.
In reply to a question by the Chairman, General JRadcliffe said
that it was not known for certain that these refugees were the wives
and families of the officers and men of the fleet. It was more than
likely that they were stray Denikinites who had found their way on
to the ships at Petrovsk. He admitted that we were not legallv
bound to remove them, but agreed with Mr. Montagu that it would
be a hard bargain to discriminate between them and the men
whom we were legally pledged to repatriate. He understood that
negotiations were being opened with the Soviet Government as to
the repatriation of the remnants of Denikin’s supporters in the
Crimea, and thought that the Enzeli refugees should also be arranged
for in these negotiations. It was hoped that by the time they had
been taken across Persia and transport had been found for them from
Basrah, the situation would admit of their being taken to the Crimea.
The Chairman said that he did not consider himself personally
bound by the bargain of the 17th February, though if the Foreign
Office had concurred in it officially he would have no more to say.
His own impression was that it was absurd to repatriate either the
officers and men or the refugees to the Crimea via Baghdad and
Basrah. Here they were within a few hundred miles of the Crimea
already. The Azerbaijan Government were friendly and were
on their knees to us nearly every day. They had already agreed
to absorb the 2,000 officers and men of Denikin’s army and to*^ do their
best to aid them financially. He did not see why an effort should
not he made to induce them also to undertake the repatriation of
the sailors and their families. The repatriation of these people via
Baghdad and Basrah would present considerable difficulties. Problems
of transport, food and shipping alike would not be easy to solve.
The presence of these people in Persia was strongly objected to by
the Persians and would be a continual embarrassment to His Majesty’s
Government. The position in the Caucasus was not, in his opinion,
as bad as some people made out. Ee did not regard it as probable
that the crews and refugees would come to any harm at Baku. He
was strongly of opinion that pressure should be brought to bear on
the Azerbaijan Government to treat them in the same way as the
2,000 officers and men. He asked what was proposed with regard
to the ships. bt