Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎111v] (222/290)

Kifri-Kirkuk
Railway.
The only chance of attaining this object would he for the Turks
to evacuate all Kurdish areas, and pressure might be brought to
bear upon them in the Peace Treaty oy making their retention of
Constantinople dependent upon this evacuation.
To balance the large areas in which the Italians and French
were to have economic priority, it might be suggested that thoso
portions of Kurdistan which the French agreed to leave to us
should form a sphere of British economic interest.
1 urning to the question of the Kifri-Kirkuk Railway he
reminded the Conference that severe criticisms had been passed in
the Cabinet on the proposed expenditure of 23 millions on
Mesopotamia. The Prime Minister had supported this criticism,
and the Secretary of State lor War had not defended the estimate
from the military point of view. The War OfHce view appeared to
be that, so long as the retention of forces on the line Hamadan-
Kazvin was considered desirable for political reasons, it became a
military necessity that the Hamadan road should be kept up. Even
so, it had been decided that the expenditure on this road should he
halved. The reduced figure might either be spent in the first six
months of the year or spread out over the whole year. He thought
that any expenditure on railway construction would be subject" to
similar drastic criticism.
Colonel Gribbon said that the Kifri-Kirkuk Railway was more
a commercial than a military consideration, but that, if it were built,
strategical requirements would demand the extension of the frontier
some way beyond it, as the railway could not run along the actual
frontier. If an autonomous Kurdish State were formed between
Mesopotamia and Persia, a line should be drawn along the watershed
north of Mosul below which no foreign interference should be
allowed in Kurdistan, though British troops shall be free to move as
necessary.
Sir Arthur Hirtzel said that the grounds on which the India
Office supported the extension of the railway, at least as far as
Kirkuk, were that in the event of disturbances on the Kurdish
frontier the presence of a railway would obviate the expense of
building cantonments.
The Chairman said that he understood the argument to be that
if we went to Mesopotamia we must go as fir as Mo«ul; if we went
to Mosul, we must have a railway ; the best commercial line for the
railway to Mosul was through Kifri and Kirkuk, and the building of
this line would necessitate a further extension of our frontier into the
Kurdish areas. On the whole, he was inclined to think that further
work on the railway should be postponed for the present.
Lord Peel said that if it were decided not to proceed with the
Kifri-Kirkuk Railway, he thought that we should reserve the right
to do so in the Peace Treaty or in separate negotiations on the subject
of economic concessions.
Sir Arthur llirtzel pointed out that the line would lie in the
old Mosul vilayet, in which he understood that the Frencli TiaT~
given up all claims.
The Conference decided that work on the Kifri-Kirkuk Railway
should not be resumed for the present.
The final decision on the future of Kurdistan would depend on
the conclusions of the Peace Conference.
(Initialled) C. of K.
Foreign Office,
February 23, 1920.
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