Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎108v] (216/290)

8
The Chairman suggested that the opposing points of view about
the reliability of General Malleson’s information should be made clear
in the record of the meeting, which would be despatched to Lord
Curzon on the following day.
With regard to queries Nos. 8 and 9, Sir Henry Wilson saw no
objection to providing General Malleson with additional British
officers for the purpose of watching the Khorasan frontier if he felt
that he could usefully employ them.
The Chairman thought that the Conference should suggest to
Lord Curzon that enquiry should be made of General Malleson on
this point.
With regard to the strengthening of the force at Meshed, the
Chairman pointed out that this again depended upon the decision as
to the three alternative lines outlined by the War Office. It appeared
that if the third alternative was the only practicable one there was
nothing to be gained by reinforcement.
General Cobhe said that there was no close connection between
the forces in Western and Eastern Persia. Only if it were decided
to occupy the line joining the two forces would it he an advantage
to transfer the Meshed force to the control of the War Office.
Sir Henry Wilson agreed that if the third alternative were to
he adopted the real point of the Meshed force would be to co-operate
in the defence of India, and it would fall more naturally under the
control of the Commander-in-Chief in India.
General Cohhe said that the prolongation of the railway to Neh
would not be justified merely for the maintenance of Genera]
Malleson’s existing force.
The Chairman suggested that the Conference should report to
Lord Curzon that only in the event of alternative (a) or (6) being
adopted should the railway be prolonged, and General Malleson’s
force transferred to the control of tlie War Office.
Sir Osmond Brock said that he had been instructed by the
Admiralty to make it clear that they were ready and willing to
control the Caspian if Baku were held, and to point out that if this
were not done now the opportunity was not likely to recur.
Mr. W 7 inston Churchill said that he entirely agreed with and
very much admired the Admiralty attitude. He had himself been
strongly opposed to our withdrawal from the Caspian, and had done
what he could to prevent it.
The Conference decided —
That the Foreign Office should telegraph to Lord Curzon in the
sense suggested by the Chairman, and that a copy of the
minutes should be forwarded to Paris at the first possible
opportunity.
(Initialled) H.
Foreign Office,
January 12, 1920.