Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎102v] (204/290)

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should be induced to withdraw at least from Turaba, and leave an
unoccupied area or “ no-man’s land ” between the two contending
forces. The case of Khurma, from King Husseins point of \iew,
had since been stated by Colonel Wilson in one of the documents
now before the Conference (I.D.C.E.—3677).. Hussein contended
that the Khurma district had for generations been under the
jurisdiction of Mecca, and that for a long time past he had been
appointing representatives there. Late in 1916 the representative
was one Khalid, who showed a tendency towards Wahabism. He
had been sent for to Mecca and admonished by King Hussein. The
fact that he had obeyed the summons appeared to establish Husseins
suzerainty over the town. During his absence the Kadi of Khurma
was twice summoned to Mecca and lectured by King Hussein for
preaching the Wahabi faith. He persisted, however, in doing this
and was'* summoned to Mecca a third time, soon after the Emir
Khalid’s return. On his refusing to obey the summons he was
discharged, and a successor appointed in his place, but Khalid then
openly raised the standard of revolt against Hussein, and refused
to allow the new Kadi to take up his duties. A suggestion
had been made that both Khalid and the Kadi were accepting
pay both from Hussein and Ibn Saud, and it appeared possible
that this might have been the case. King Hussein had made
two efforts to subdue his rebel lieutenant by force, but two
successive expeditions led by Shakir and the Emir Abdullah
were ignominiously defeated by the Akhwan. It was clear that
whatever might be the rights of the case there was no comparison
whatever between the military forces. The danger of a Wahabi
advance on Mecca had been so acute at the time of the last meeting
that the Conference had more or less gone back on their original
policy of supporting King Hussein. They had, as it were, been
stampeded by the military danger to the Holy Places. They had
also been rather taken with the idea of the proposed Boundary (.Com
mission, and had been inclined to consider Hussein unreasonable
because he would not accept it. They were now told that as a
matter of amour-propre King Hussein could not admit arbitration
on the ownership of Khurma. He regarded this place as so much a
part of the Hejaz that if he were to agree to arbitration upon its
ownership he would lose prestige in Arabia to the same extent
that Great Britain, for example, would lose prestige if she accepted
arbitration on the ownership of a part of these islands. In reply to
any suggestion that he should accept arbitration, Hussein was
always prepared to fire off his last cartridge and threaten to abdicate.
He had pressed the trigger more than once, but the result had only
been a misfire ; only that day a report had been received from Jeddah
that he had done it again. His Majesty’s Government were being
made to look rather ridiculous by the stubbornness of this sensitive
old man, and he did not himself see why he could not be brought to
reason.
The Conference should not lose sight of the fact that the policy
of His Majesty’s Government was essentially a Hussein policy. Ibn
Saud was undoubtedly important, but not so important to them as
the Sherif of Mecca. Colonel Wilson wished to be given some
reassuring message to take to King Hussein, and it was for the
Conference to consider what form this message should take. At the
same time, they had to consider what reply could be given to the
questions asked by Ibn Saud’s delegation who were now in London,
and were to return in a few days to their own country. These
questions were to be found in one of the papers laid before the Con
ference (LD.C.E.-3675.)
Colonel Wilson said that he himself regarded the ownership of
Khurma by King Hussein as absolutely incontestable. He con
sidered it almost certain that if Ibn Saud’s j^rovernment remained at
Khurma and Turaba, King Hussein would definitely abdicate. It