Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎77v] (154/290)

2
to Teheran, and Sir Percy Cox would probably have some
observations to offer on tbe effect which would be produced m eisia
by the withdrawal of General Mallesons force towards the 1 u/( ap
railhead.
The Chairman said that it was extremely desirable that
General Malleson should stay at Meshed as long as possible. He
was presumably acting in close co-operation with the Persian
Governor, and the 1,200 gendarmerie, and 250 Cossacks mentioned
in paragraph 3 of the Viceroy’s telegram, were in the employ of the
Persian Government. General Malleson, as the commander on
the spot, would presumably be free to dispose of the available
troops at his discretion. In what seemed the improbable event of
the Bolsheviks crossing the Persian frontier, he would doubtless
draw in his outposts from Bajgiram and Kuchan, and concentrate
his force at Meshed.
General Cox pointed out that General Malleson’s telegram had
been despatched before he knew of the later Afghan developments,
which were likely to result in a cessation of hostilities. He was
clearly apprehensive of a combined attack by Bolsheviks and Afghans
from the direction of Herat. The strategy of the proposed with
drawal to Kain was governed by the necessity of withdrawing his
front to a point south of Herat, and thus minimising the danger of a
blow being struck at his line of communications. There was a
service of light cars from the Uuzdap railhead to Meshed, but it
would take a long time to arrange for the despatch of any reinforce
ments which might be required. In Seistan itself there was only a
consular guard of twenty or thirty men. The Khorassan and Seistan
levies were mostly Hazaras ; they were good raw material but had
only been raised recently, and could hardly be regarded yet as a
disciplined force. He was strongly of opinion that it would be
unwise to discount the probability of an offensive combination of
Bolsheviks and Afghans until the month of Bamzan was well over.
Sir Arthur Eirtzel said that news had recently been received—
be understood from Switzerland—that Enver Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. had arrived in
Turkestan. He was said to have very considerable influence with
the Bolsheviks, and to be raising a large volunteer army, including
many local Indians. As soon as direct communication was established
with Afghanistan, Enver and his arm)' were to enter the country,
accompanied by many Russian, German, and Turkish officers. A
mission left Berlin about the 24th May for Afghanistan via
Bokhara and Merv. Another mission of available Indian and Afridi
soldiers in Germany was organised on the 21 st May, and was to
proceed to the Indian frontier at once, with the help of facilities
provided by the Bolshevik Government. The German Government
had been asked to sanction 100,000 M. for each of the above
missions.
These missions had clearly been despatched with the object of
appealing to Pan-Islamic sentiment, and inducing the Moslems of
those regions to combine with the Bolsheviks. He thought that
they would play the Pan-Islamic card for all it was worth, and
appeal to the Persians as fellow-Moslems to turn out what they
would represent as the anti-Islamic element, represented by Malleson’s
force.
The Chairman said that these missions would be rather discon
certed if they found on their arrival that the Amir of Afghanistan
had made peace with the British Government. He did not himself
think that the advantage the Bolsheviks would gain by attacking
General Malleson without Afghan co-operation would outweigh the
disadvantages of military operations against the sacred city of
Meshed. The Bolshevik line had been swaying backwards and
forwards in the neighbourhood of the Krasnovodsk-Merv railway
for some time, but he did not think that it was at all clear yet that