Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎74v] (148/290)

evacuated from the Caucasus, but this would take a long time
He reminded the Conference that any appearance on our part ot
withholding the support asked for by King Hussein might antagonise
Feisal, and" increase our difficulties in Syria. He mentioned that
aeroplanes had been of great effect at Nejef, even though no bombs
had actually been dropped, and he urged strongly that the
co-operation of the flight which had been sent to Jeddah at
Hussein’s request should not be withheld in deference to the views
of the Government of India.
Miss Bell, replying to a question by the Chairman, said that it
was difficult to sav what would be the effect in Mesopotamia of a
complete defeat of Hussein and Abaulla by Ibn baud, and a \\ cdiabi
occupation of the Holy Cities ; the inhabitants of Koweit and Coheir,
who lived on the fringe of the Nejd and had been in contact with the
Wahabis, cordially disliked them, and their views would probably be
reflected in other parts of Mesopotamia. It should be remembered
that to the Wahabis Medina was not a Holy City, and the Sunnis of
Iraq would certainly be unfavourably affected if the pilgrimage to
Mecca were restrained by Wahabis from proceeding to Medina.
The Chairman said it appeared that Ibn Saud had lost control
of his own men and that no further steps on our part, whether fiom
the Ked Sea or the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. side, were likely to have any effect
in restraining the Wahabis. We were expecting Ibn Sauds^ rep y
to our message in the course of a day or two, and beyond finding
out from the various authorities concerned what action was
considered practicable or desirable in the event of a W ahabi advance
on Jeddah, he did not think that anything could usefully be done.
King Hussein had never been diffident about asking for assistance,
and'he thought that we should wait for an appeal from him before
considering either further financial assistance or the leplacement of
the guns which had been lost by Abdulla.
The Conference decided —
(1.) That the Foreign Office should ascertain from the Ministry
of Shipping what prospect there was of evacuating
refugees from Jeddah:
(2.) That the War Office should ask the General Officer Com
manding Egypt Force what Mahommedan troops,
whether Soudanese or Indian, would be available for
covering a possible withdrawal at short notice .
(3.) That the Secretary of State for India should consult the
Mahommedan member of the India Council and the
Government of India on the probable attitude of the
Indian Mahommedcns in the event of an appeal being
made to them by King Hussein to co-operate in the
defence of the Holy Places against the Wahabis.
(Initialled) C. of K.
Foreign Office,
June 13, 1919.