Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎73v] (146/290)

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if not actually on his way to the Hejaz. A flight of aeroplanes had
been sent by General Alleuby to Hussein’s assistance, subject to a
protest from the Government of India, but his original intention to
despatch a company of Indian Mahommedans as escort had been
vetoed on the representation of the Secretary of State for India.
There appeared to be some fear that the French would offer to send
Mahommedan troops, and General Allenby had been instructed to
deprecate the use of French troops to the exclusion of our own, and
to endeavour to ensure French participation being confined to
co-operation on an insignificant scale, if and when it was decided
that British troops should be sent. Hussein himself was apparently
content with the moral prestige of aeroplane support. He had
replied to a proposal from Feisal to call upon the Allies for
Mahommedan troops by warning him not to ask for any French or
other forces. He had expressed the opinion that if neither the
aeroplanes nor the message to tbn Sand had the desired effect, it
would be preferable for him to resign. Last came the critical
question—on which a decision had to be reached without delay—of
the steps which should be taken in the event of a stream of
fugitives pouring down to Jeddah and claiming British protection.
The Conference had to decide whether His Majesty’s Government
should take the unprecedented step of defending Jeddah, and, if not,
whether they should arrange for the evacuation of fugitives, and how
this could be done. He was himself inclined to the opinion, which
was, however, prompted by. instinct rather than by reason, that
Ibn Saud would hold his hand when he realised that we were
determined to maintain our policy of supporting Hussein against him.
Miss Bell feared that we could not reckon on this. Ibn Saud
was not a great tribal chieftain like Ibn Rashid. He Lad been
trying for some time to hold out against the Akhwan movement and
to restrain his fanatical adherents, but they had apparently collected
in unexpectedly large numbers, and she was doubtful whether Ibn
Saud could control them now even if he wished to. Abdulla’s
force must have been exceedingly badly handled for the Wahabis to
have defeated it as they had, and the effect on them of their victory
would almost certainly be that the last vestige of any control which
Ibn Saud had exercised over them wamld vanish.
Replying to questions by the Chairman, Miss Bell said that,
without actually differing from the policy wdiich had been adopted,
she was inclined to think that the measures taken to carry it out
had not been quite fair to Ibn Saud. She realised that he had put
His Majesty’s Government in the position of having to decide a
vexed question without an opportunity of investigating it thoroughly,
but she doubted whether it had been made sufficiently clear to
him that he would so completely lose our support if he persisted in
enforcing his claims. Whether intentionally or not, we had en
couraged him to think that he would be given a position equal to
that of King Hussein. The actual aggression at Khurma she did
not think he could have stopped in any case. As regards the steps
to be taken now to support Hussein she did not feel competent to
advise.
Mr. Montagu explained that his reason for deprecating the em
ployment of Indian Mahommedan troops was the fear of unpleasant
incidents, or even mutiny, amongst the Mahommedans of the Indian
Army when they heard that Indian troops were being sent to support
a Mahommedan chief who had rebelled against the Caliph. He
understood the view of the Indian Moslems to be that Hussein owed
his position as guardian of the Holy Places to the Sultan of Turkey,
who in his capacity as Caliph had recognised and subsidised him!
They would say that he had been bought over by us to be a traitor
to his master, and the despatching of Indian Mahommedan troops
to his assistance would be putting an unfair strain on Mahommedan
elements in the Indian army.