Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎66r] (131/290)

Cox’s scheme was one that might be carried through with great
advantage.
Sir Percy Cox had also telegraphed a powerful and effective
reply to the objections of the Government of India in his telegram
No. 324 of the 30th April.
Mr. Balfour, in Paris, had been content to leave the actual
details of the negotiations to the Foreign Office in London, though
this, of course, did not imply that he would not accept respon
sibility for the final agreement. He was at present conhning his
action to keeping Mushaver and his colleagues away from: the
Peace Conference. His reply to a recent telegram from the
Foreign Office implied general approval of the line which the
negotiations were taking, as he referred in it to the difficulties
experienced by the Persian delegates in their attempts to obtain
a hearing from the Peace Conference, and to the extreme poverty
of their case.
If the agreement was to be made with the Persian Govern
ment, it should be completed with the least possible delay. Ihe
possibility of unfavourable eventualities in Paris should not be
lost sight of. Even if the Germans agreed to sign the Preliminary
Peace Treaty, a long time would elapse before the complicated
questions involved in the Peace settlements were finally solved.
The present position in Egypt was well known to the Conference,
and there appeared to be the possibility of disturbance in Meso
potamia during the period which must elapse before the proposed
International Commission had completed its report. Within the
last few days the situation in Afghanistan had become serious and
menacing. He had no confidence in the ability of the Peace C on
ference to solve the intricate problems of the Middle East. He
had asked himself what was the duty of a British politician in
these circumstances, and was convinced that it was to build up
the bastions of India, which had always been and must always be
the pivot and focus of British interests in the East. Ihe war
had changed the position of Persia from the point of view of
British interests. She now lay between India and Mesopotamia,
and a tranquil Persia was of vital importance to the prosperity
of both countries. He looked on the present opportunity of estab
lishing Persian stability as one which ought not to be lost, and it
was in that spirit that he had approached the proposed agreement.
He wished to make it clear that these negotiations, which involved
large questions of statesmanship, ought not, in his opinion, to be
handled in any narrow or small-minded spirit.
Mr. Montagu concurred in the Chairman’s views, and said
that he desired to explain the reasons which had prompted him to
* disagree with the policy of the Government of India. He had
always recognised the advantage of our staying in Persia, to assist
in the maintenance of order, &c. His objection had been to our
doing so against the will of the Persians. Hitherto the best we
had been able to look for had been a sullen acquiescence in British
advice and control. Now that the Persians themselves, repre
sented by the strongest Persian Government of his experience,
had actually asked us to help them, it would, in his opinion, be
the worst kind of folly for us not to seize the opportunity. He
wished to make it clear that his disagreement with the Govern
ment of India was not to be taken as implying that he approved
of our committing ourselves finally to direct interference with
Persian alfairs. He wished to make the reservation that in the
event of any future Persian Government being unwilling that we
should continue in the same close relations with them, we must be
at liberty to reconsider our position.
The Chairman accepted Mr. Montagu’s reservation, in which
he concurred The position in Persia was very different from that
in Egypt. It was quite impossible for us to leave Egypt under