Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎58r] (115/290)

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Rowanduz, Amadia, and Jezirat-ibn-Oraar. They would be governed
by local chieftains with British political advisers, who would be
directly under Baghdad. A greater measure of autonomy could be
granted to such small hill States than would be practicable in the
plains. If this solution were accepted, the Mosul province would
include Erbil, Akra, and Zakho.
The Chairman enquired how it was proposed to graft Diarbekir,
Urfa, and Jerablus on to this second alternative, in the event of
its beino- decided that these districts should be entrusted to the
© • .
Mesopotamian administration.
Colonel Wilson replied that he earnestly hoped that no such
decision would be arrived at. Any combination of Diarbekir and
Urfa with Suleimaniyeh was in his opinion out of the question. He
pointed out that the administration of the Diarbekir area would
involve greatly increased military responsibilities. If it were
inevitable that we should undertake Diarbekir and Urfa, he con
sidered that a separate province should be formed with headquarters
at Diarbekir. He agreed that the Kurds of the Mosul area might be
subject to political influence from Diarbekir, but did not consider that
the connection was sufficiently strong to outweigh the lack of
symmetry involved in a combination of these areas with Mesopotamia.
Mr. Kidston remarked that there appeared to be plenty of
claimants to the Diarbekir-Jezirat-ibn-Omar area. He instanced
Cherif Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. , Abdul Kadir, and the Badr Khan family.
Colonel Wilson did not think that these people need be taken
very seriously. They were out of touch with local conditions, and
not likely to be welcomed by the people. He would himself prefer
to see the Turks in Diarbekir.
Replying to a question by the Chairman, he said that he
definitely preferred the second of the two alternatives.
Sir T. Holderness pointed out that the proposed arrangements
for the administration of the Kurdish States might find an analogy
in those of the Shan States in Burma, which are grouped for the
purpose of control and supervision under a British Superintendent,
but are governed by tribal chiefs, who are individually responsible for
the preservation of order and suppression of crime in their respective
States.
Colonel Wilson concurred. He explained that Major Noel was
also in favour of the second alternative. He was an enthusiast, with
an enthusiast’s limitations. At the same time he had a great
personal hold over the Kurds, and had made a great success of the
administration of Suleimaniyeh. Major E. B. Soane was another
expert on Kurdish affairs. He was now at Suleimaniyeh endeavouring
to put the brake on the national aspirations which Major Noel had been
perhaps a little too successful in arousing. So long as they had the right
stamp of officer available, he did not think that there would be much
difficulty in managing the local chieftains. There was only one point
which might be considered an argument in favour of a combined
Kurdistan under direct British administration. He understood that
Mesopotamia was to be called upon to contribute 400,000L a year
towards the Ottoman Public Debt. Of this about 150,000Z. used to
come from Kurdish tobacco dues, which were collected by the Turks
through the Ottoman Regie by means of a system of effective
control. He feared that autonomous Kurdish chieftains might put
obstacles in the way of the collection of these dues.
Sir T. Holderness mentioned the Indian analogy of the salt line
in Rajputana, and suggested a line of customs-houses.
Colonel Wilson pointed out that it would be easy to smuggle
the tobacco over the Persian frontier for re-export to Mesopotamia.
[987]—571 B 2