Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎48v] (96/290)

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General Thwaites said the only grounds for remaining' in
South Persia were political. There was no military necessity for
remaining. It was true that the removal of our troops would create
a vacuum, but this could perhaps be filled by the South Persia
Rifles. An early decision was necessary because, if our troops
were to remain in South Persia over the hot weather, special
accommodation would have to be made for them.
The Chairman asked if there was any invincible reason why the
troops should not be evacuated after May 1st.
General Cox said that even for fresh troops the Gulf in
summer was an ordeal. These were tired men, and to remove
them by transport after May would be to invite casualties. In
reply to a question by the Chairman, he said they might be camped
in the hills for the summer. The Bushire garrison could be
reduced to a minimum and the rest of the troops sent to the hills.
Mr. Oliphant said Colonel Hunter, late of South Persia Rifles,
had expressed his opinion that no fear need be felt for the men on
climatic grounds if they were sent to the hills.
Mr. Shuckburgh said that, in the view of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , the
arguments remained as they were as regards local conditions. We
could not continue to maintain troops indefinitely in a neutral
country. They must be withdrawn some time, and that being so
we should seize the earliest opportunity of withdrawing. There
was no military object in our remaining. On the other hand, the
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. felt the force of the argument that from the political
point of view the present was not an opportune time for with
drawal. If the Foreign Office considered that the golden moment
had arrived in our negotiations with Persia, and that withdrawal
would prejudice our chances of success, the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. would
probably be prepared to agree to the retention of the reduced force
for a limited period.
The Chairman agreed with Mr. Shuckburgh that such a
moment had in all probability been reached in Anglo-Persian
relations. Until the last few days, the position had been very
promising; but in view of the information contained in telegrams
Nos. 247 and 249 from Sir Percy Cox, we might expect a period of
the usual haggling and indecision. Meantime, the only person in
a position to judge the influence of withdrawal on the political
situation was Sir Percy Cox. Since the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. shared the
Foreign Office view that the whole question of withdrawal hinged
on its effect on our negotiations with Persia, it w^as essential that
Sir Percy Cox’s opinion should be obtained as early as possible.
We should also consider whether it was necessary to retain the
whole of the minimum force contemplated by the General Officer
Commanding, Bushire. Would not one battalion be enough ?
General Kirke said, in his opinion, one battalion was too few.
Such a reduction would involve the risk of our having to send an
expeditionary force to extricate the garrison. It should also be
borne in mind that the further they went into the hills for the
summer, the longer would be their line of communication and the
greater the danger of its interruption. A request had recently been
received for a flight of aeroplanes, which indicated that further
reduction was not thought advisable. But the question was difficult
to decide from here, and the military opinion of the man on the
spot was necessary.
I'he Chairman said we were apt to get needlessly frightened
about what might happen in the event of withdrawal. Trans-Caspia
w as a case in point.
Mr. Shuckburgh suggested that the GTovernment of India should
be informed that the question was still unsettled, and should be