Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎39r] (77/290)

27
1919 .
arrangements, and to allow tlie relative value of sterling,
rouble notes, and local currencies to establish itself by
the natural law of supply and demand.
(ii.) To send out an expert financial adviser.
But our policy
towards Bolshevism
in South Russia
appears to require
definition. Thus the
C.-in-C., Mediter
ranean, asks the
Admiralty (telegram
No. 278, dated
February 18, 1919)
if active assistance
may be given to the
volunteer army.
If only the “ new Republics ” and ourselves were concerned, the
above measures would probably be sufficient to ensure the policy of
His Majesty’s Government being carried out. But the situation is
complicated by the entry of Denikin and the Bolshevists on the
stage. Denikin appears to be credited by the new Republics with a
double aim :—
1 . To drive back # tbe Bolshevists. In this he has our
sympathy, which has expressed itself in the bombing of
Grozny (telegram from Rear-Admiral, Black Sea, No. 835,
the 19th February, 1919) and the proposed attack on
the Astrakhan Fleet. _
2 . To re-establish the pre-war Russian frontier. With this
aim, if it exists, w’e have no sympathy, but the fact of
our IsiciisoTi with Denikin, combined with his recent over
running of Daghestan and parts of Georgia and
Azerbaijan, has given the “ new Republics an excuse
for doubting the genuineness of our desire to see stiong
and independent” States in the Caucasus.
II. Denikin and Georgia.
(a.) Attitude of Georgians. —The Georgians regard Denikin with
the greatest suspicion :—
“ Georgians are even more bitterly hostile to Denikin, who
represents the monarchical ideal to them, than they to the
Bolshevists, and they consider any movement of Denikin’s against
the Georgian Republic must have received our support owing
to our close liaison with him. (No. I. 4269 of the 3rd
January).
In Georgia :—
“ Anti-Russian feelings are strong in all parties, and British
are distrusted.” (Report by Major McDonnel, late British consul
at Tiflis, dated the 1 st January, quoted in telegram No. I 4596
of the 25th January, from G.H.Q., Constantinople).
“ Georgian public is at present just as favourably disposed
towards the Bolshevists as towards us.” (Telegram from
advanced G.H.Q., Tiflis, quoted by G.H.Q., Constantinople, in
No. I. 4578 of the 24th January).
I. 4269, January S,
1919.
I, 4449, January 15,
1919.
74791, February 1,
1919.
From G.O.C.,
Constantinople,
C 90, February 7,
(b.) Progress of Events—At the beginning of January the
Georgians were firmly convinced Denikin was concentrating troops
at Touapse for attack on Georgian Republic. G.H.Q., Batum,
assured the Georgian representatives there that Denikin had no such
intention. General Poole was asked by Constantinople to take such
action with Denikin as he thought necessary. . .
On the 15th January, on a proposal being made for a mission
under General Lovchen, G.H.Q. sent a telegram to Poole, saying .
“Consider Denikin’s mission under General Lovchen would only
complicate situation and lead to breakdown of present plans, and
therefore that mission should be cancelled.
On the 1 st February the War Office replied that they
considered Denikin’s Mission under Lovchen fulfils a useful purpose
provided it did not interfere with area south of Kizil Burun
Zakhtali, along crest of Caucasus to Touapse.
On the 6 th February Denikin’s Volunteer army landed south of
Sochi and delivered ultimatum to effect that Georgians-should lay