Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎31v] (62/290)

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Situation in the Nakhichevan District.
This district, the northern and southern boundaries of which have not yet been
completely defined, is mainly Tartar, and has never been occupied effectively by the
Armenian Republic, which they claim to do. As the result of recent disturbances, it
has been found necessary to institute a British Military Governorship for it, with the
local emergency Tartar Government as an administrative council. How* this will work
time alone will show.
Every man is armed to the teeth, and, in addition, there exists some sort of armed
forces of which 1 have not yet received particulars. The possibility of disturbances is
very much the same as in the case of the Armenian Republic, except that here the
Tartars are in the majority and will not be so easy to keep in order as the Armenians.
When the spring comes, they will want to drive their herds on to the lands administered
by the Armenian Republic. For this reason, I consider it essential that an infantry
battalion and two troops of cavalry should remain in the district.
Situation in the Georgian Republic.
The Government, which calls itself democratic, is really ultra-Socialistic of the
most advanced type. Nationalisation of land and wealth has been the rule, thus
reducing the former ruling classes to impotency. Administrative posts have been filled
with incompetent and wasteful staffs all drawing large salaries, and it is doubtful to
what extent a single Government office contributes to the revenue of the country.
Certainly the railways and telegraphs are run at a considerable loss. When funds run
low some form of wealth is nationalised, and the money thus obtained, less official
peculations, is applied to replenishing them. In this way a wealthy Armenian wine
merchant in Tiflis has just been plundered of his stock by special Act of Parliament.
In addition, it is said that the house property in Tiflis will shortly be nationalised ;
and as house property belongs chiefly to Armenians, whom the Georgians detest, the
measure will be a popular method of temporarily increasing the revenue. In fact, the
Republic is to all intents and purposes a Bolshevist Republic, which intends to keep its
plunder to itself, and therefore has not much use for other Bolsheviks.
The President of the Council and the Secretary for Foreign Affairs are the two
most moderate men in the Government, which is, however, a very weak one, and held
together only by the cohesive force of a policy of universal national plunder. It is
believed to be on the verge of bankruptcy, and in this fact now lies the chief danger;
for bad and weak as the Government is, there does not appear to be any strong man to
form a better one, that is to say, a Government which would try to put its house in
order and would incur unpopularity to increase taxes and railway and postal charges.
The Government is not popular with all parties, and two other parties are known to
exist, one Russian and the other Bolshevist. Neither is powerful, but either or both
is capable of making mischief should the Government get into trouble. So far as active
hostility on the part of the present Government is concerned the situation has
undoubtedly been greatly improved by the recent declaration of sympathy of the
British Government, but covert hostility largely exists, e.g., every conceivable difficulty
is put in the way of railway administration, and up to date it has been found impossible
to co-ordinate the railway administration of the different republics. Other difficulties
are put in the way of procuring accommodation and supplies for the troops, and
undoubtedly there is still a very strong pro-German feeling. Should the Government
fail, there is considerable chance of an interregnum of anarchy. There are over
100,000 well-hated Armenians in the town, and a massacre is always to be feared.
The peace strength of the army is about eighteen battalions, but for service
against Armenia in the recent conflict the Republic mobilised some 20,000 to 25,000
men in about a fortnight. It is unlikely that the army would be used against British
troops, certainly not by the present Government; but still it is a danger requiring
careful consideration, more especially having regard to the Bolshevist danger from the
north, and to the possibility of having to defend Georgia from Bolshevist invasion from
beyond the Caucasus main watershed The boundary between adjacent drainage basins. . Bolshevists at Vladikavkaz may actually
invade Georgia to obtain recruits, or may even be driven in to escape from a
victorious Denikin’s army. Undoubtedly they are filling Georgia with their agents
and propaganda.
It would appear necessary to retain the following troops in Georgia :—
(a.f At Poti, half battalion until all the Germans have been evacuated.
(6.) On the railway between Notanebi and Tiflis, one battalion.