Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎27v] (54/290)

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If we left the Caucasus there seemed to be only two alterna
tives for the future of the new States—-either Denikin would
recover them for Russia, or they would turn Bolshevist. He did
not believe that without external military backing they could
stand by 'themselves.
There was one other point which had to be taken into con
sideration: when we went, who was to take our place? He had
heard with amazement that at Paris recently it had been suggested
that the Italians should go into the Caucasus, but nobody really
believed that the Italians, without a penny to spare, would be
able either to finance that region or to provide the minimum of
two divisions necessary to police it. The fact was that nobody
was likely to take our place. We had therefore two questions to
consider: (1) If we were going to evacuate the Caucasus, when
should we do so?; and (2) If we did so,”what consequences would
be produced? The first question was one mainly for the naval
and military authorities to answer, the second, in its essence, was
political.
Mr. 11 inston ( hurchill said that the War Office had not been
responsible for the policy in the Caucasus. The development of
force there, at which the Chairman had expressed his surprise,
was the result of telegrams which, he understood, had been
approved by the Eastern Committee.
/ he Chairman said that until the papers now before the Con
ference had reached them a few days ago, nobody was aware of
the obligations which had been incurred, and it had certainly never
been either our policy or our intention that such extensive liabili-
tres should be undertaken.
Mr. Winston Churchill said personally he had read the tele
grams, but had taken no part rn framing them. It was for the
Government to say what the War Office was to do, and it was for
the War Office to carry out the Government’s policy in ship-shape
fashion, and to see that men and supplies were sent in adequate
numbers. Ihese had been the grounds for sending the additional
forces, and for this he took the responsibility. It seemed that our
policy was to keep things quiet pending the decisions of the Peace
onterence and the League of Nations. He himself was interested
m fighting the Bolsheviks, and if evacuation was going to result
m bringing about Denikin s downfall, he would regret it; but he
did not think evacuation would have this result.
7 he ("hairman said he was not afraid that Denikin would fall
if we went out, but he was seriously afraid that by our withdrawal
we might divert Denikin's attention from the north to these newlv-
formed States m the Caucasus. J
Mr. If inston Churchill said he was in favour of the quickesl
possible evacuation of our troops from the Caucasus, and at the
same time of giving Denikin the support of a Military Mission
and of munitions and arms, provided he did not pass a certair
wo?dd J! Ch COu d ? x - In hls 0 I )in i° n such definite support
would be of far greater assistance to Denikin in his struck
agamst the Bolsheviks than the mere presence of our troops on the
other side of the Caucasus. F
But, before we evacuated, the situation at Astrakhan and in
fhe ( aspian must be cleared up, and measures must be taken tc
prevent the cutting off of our troops at Krasnovodsk. Once rid od
the Astrakhan fleet our own ships could be handed over to Denikic
as part of the mission He would, therefore, like to see the
Admiralty proposals with regard to Astrakhan brought off as earlv
as possible, and hoped at the same time to see Denikin move up and
hold the line and especially the mouth)' of the Volga. ItTould
then be possible to hand over the ships, and at the same time make
a convention with Denikin as to the conditions on which he would