Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎16v] (32/290)

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held, ensuring our line of communication to the Caspian, and thereby the maintenance
of our naval supremacy on that sea. In addition to this, hostilities between the embryo
States of Georgia and Armenia have been repressed, order has to a great extent been
established, and railway communication restored throughout Trans-Caucasia. The
accomplishment of these objects has necessitated a considerable dispersion of the
British forces, and this has led to a request for further troops from General Milne.
The following alternative courses of action would now appear to present
themselves, depending on the policy which His Majesty’s Government may see lit
to adopt:—
(a.) Confining ourselves to purely military action, and disclaiming all attempts to
regulate the internal administration of the country, we should concentrate
our forces for the immediate protection of the Batoum-Baku railway,
withdrawing all detachments that are not essential for that purpose, except
from Petrovsk, which the Navy require us to occupy. It must be realised
that in this case there will be considerable risk of internal disorder, and
even open hostilities breaking out between the rival States of the
Caucasus.
In default of armed intervention it will then be for us to do our best to
compose such differences by means of British Missions at the various
seats of local Government, and be encouraging the development of trade
gradually to induce the re-establishment of peace and prosperity.
(b.) We should definitely assume control of the administration of the various
embryo States, including responsibility for finance, police, railways, &c.,
establishing for the time being what in fact would amount to a protectorate
of Trans-Caucasia.
If (a) is adopted it is considered that with the troops now under orders to join him
—which will give him nine British and ten Indian infantry battalions—General Milne
will have sufficient forces to carry out the policy. Should it be decided, however, to
adopt (b) the inevitable dispersion of troops thereby entailed would render further
reinforcements necessary.
In view of those considerations and the urgent necessity of economising troops to
meet the demands of demobilisation, the General Staff are in favour of reducing our
commitments to the minimum and concentrating the available British forces for the
immediate protection of the Batoum-Baku railway and of such places as Petrovsk,
which are essential to our naval supremacy on the Caspian.
It is submitted that an early and definite decision should be taken on the question
to obviate the danger of our being involved in matters of internal policy and
administration from which it will be difficult ultimately to dissociate ourselves unless
a clean cut be made forthwith.
(c.) There remains the possibility of immediately withdrawing our forces
altogether from the Caucasus, but this course is open to the following
objections :—
(i.) It will entail the abandonment of our naval control of the Caspian, and
of our communications with Krasnovodsk.
(ii.) It will prevent the supply of General Marshall’s troops in North-west
Persia, which are at present fed from Enzeli under General Milne’s
arrangements.
(iii.) It will react most unfavourably on General Denikin’s forces and
encourage the growth of Bolshevism in Georgia and other districts
of the Caucasus, which are already showing a tendency in that
direction.
General Staff, February 12, 1919.