Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎14r] (27/290)

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Bolshevik. On the 3rd February the British Senior Naval Officer
said that he expected, in the event of disturbances occurring, that
this flotilla would turn against him.
In Astrakan the Bolsheviks had at least four destroyers and
two submarines, which were at present frozen in. There were also
tenor eleven armed ships—one of which was an i(?e-breaker—carrying
4-inch and 3-inch guns ; some of these ships were reported to have
as many as five 5-inch guns. If the Caspian flotilla sided with the
Astrakan Bolsheviks against us we would be in a minority of more
than two to one. It therefore followed that the Caspian flotilla
must be dealt with now before this junction could take place.
The navy was in the Caspian for the purpose of maintaining
the line of communications to Trans-Caspia. Its existence there was
also vital for the Hamadan-Enzeli-Baku line of communications.
Not to hold the Caspian would render impossible the sending of
supplies to the troops east of Hamadan under winter conditions.
Mr. Montagu said that these troops were put there originally
as a barrier against the Turks, the Germans, or the Bolsheviks
getting into Persia.
General Radcliffe said that they had never constituted a
military barrier, but all the force had been expected to do was to
stop agents from coming through.
The Chairman said that what had happened was as follows :
Before the armistice a force known as “ Dunsterforce ” had been
placed under the command of General Dunsterville and sent north,
with the object of encouragino- the formation of a new Bussian State
at Tiflis or thereabouts. General Dunsterville had arrived too late
to carry out this intention. He then had obtained leave to go on to
Baku, but there he had found the enemy too strong and had been
forced to withdraw. Then followed the forward military movement
from Khanikin. We had gone there to close the route into Persia
from the north-west side.
Mr. Montagu said that the argument seemed to be in a circle.
We were told that we had to hold the Batum-Baku line for the sake
of the Hamadan-Enzeh line, and we also had to hold the Caspian for
the sake of the Hamadan-Enzeli. He suggested that if the Hamadan-
Enzeli line were evacuated, one of the reasons for holding the Caspian
went by the board. So long as the Batum-Baku line was held he
saw no reason for holding the other.
The Chairman said that in this connection two points had to be
borne in mind. The first was that the Hamadan to Caspian troops
helped Sir Percy Cox’s position in Persia. The second, that our
position in the Caucasus on the Batum-Baku line might not be
permanent. We could not therefore withdraw from the Hamadan-
Enzeli line.
Mr. Montagu said that he was alarmed by Captain Aylmer’s
information. It appeared that the enerny had solved the insoluble
problem of bringing submarines into the Caspian. The point arose
that if an action took place we should probably have casualties, and
it would then be asked why we were in the Caspian at all. What
was the object in our being there ?
The Chairman said that so long as we had held Trans-Caspia
and Krasnovodsk there had been an object. It had been necessary
to maintain a line of communications across the Caspian. Now
Trans-Caspia was being evacuated, and he gathered that we were
retaining our naval forces in the Caspian as a flank protection for the
Batum-Baku line.
Captain Aylmer said that the navy was essential for the
protection of the flank of the Caucasus army. If our ships were
not in the Caspian, Baku, with all its stores, could be destroyed in a.
[987]—224 C