Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎12v] (24/290)

(2.) The Secretary should tabulate these telegrams and
memoranda under heads suited to the purposes of the
Conference, as was done in the Eastern Committee, and
circulate them to members.
2. The Conference had before them the following papers on the
situation in Trans-Caucasia : A note by the chairman, dated the 2nd
February, 1919; a Minute by Mr. G. J. Kidston, dated the
7th February ; and a note by the General Staff, War Office, dated
the 12th February.
The Chairman said there were indications that the situation in
the Caucasus was tending to slip out of the grasp of the Conference.
Our policy had been this : We had held that it would be necessary
to maintain for a time in the Caucasus forces sufficient to hold
the line from Batoum to Baku, keep order in the capital cities, and
retain control over the Caspian. We had had no desire to encroach
into inter-State quarrels, nor had we contemplated crossing the
Caucasus on the north, or going to Erivan in the south. Our
policy had not gone further than the maintenance of control from
east to west, the important point being the Caspian. But from
General Thomson’s note, dated the 6th December, 1918, he had
gathered that a much more extended series of military operations
was being contemplated, and recent telegrams indicated that they
had already commenced. Thus Petrovsk had been occupied. An
aeroplane base appeared to have been created 60 miles north of
Petrovsk. Bombing operations had been carried out against Grozny.
Kars, he found to his surprise, had been entered. One division was
in the Caucasus. Three battalions had been sent out to reinforce it,
and still General Milne was not satisfied, and was asking for two
divisions. At least a month ago, after consultation with General
Thwakes, he had drawn up a telegram to General Milne asking for
a survey of the position in the Caucasus. Up to date General
Milne’s reply had not been received.
General Radcliffe said the report had just left Constantinople,
and was being brought by an officer.
The Chairman said we were very much in the dark as to what
was actually happening in the Caucasus. He had felt it necessary
to obtain more light on the subject, and had drawn up the note
before the meeting asking the military authorities for their view
of the situation. The reply of the General Staff had now arrived,
and, as it had not been seen by everybody, he would read it to the
Conference. But, before reading the note, he desired to mention
that a meeting had apparently been convened of the military
authorities of the Great Powers at Paris to discuss the occupation of
the Caucasus pending peace, and it was reported that a decision had
been arrived at to hand it over to the Italians. The proposition
seemed to him astounding. It might be that it would afford a
solution in the future, but he did not know any reason for it at the
present lime, nor could he understand why the Italians, who were
quite detached from the Caucasus and its problems, should be willing
to send troops there, in view of the fact that they w^ere not less
anxious to proceed with their demobilisation than we were ourselves,
and that we were already on the spot. It seemed strange that,
while the Americans had no intention of going to the Caucasus, the
Italians should express their readiness to take .up the burden. No
doubt Mr. Montagu would throw some light on this point later on.
The Chairman then read to the Conference a note by the
General Staff entitled ‘^Situation in Trans-Caucasia” (Appendix I).
General Radcliffe, in answer to a question by the Chairman,
said that the forces at present in the Caucasus amounted to one