Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎9v] (18/290)

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heavy guns, the British infantry (for whom the conditions in Trans-
Caspia were unsuitable) could be relieved. But he had not stated
whether he could supply these Indian reinforcements from the
Caucasus, or whether ihey would have to come from India.
General Radcliffe said that General Milne had already com
plained of a shortage of Indian troops in the Caucasus. The troops,
if sent, would probably go from the Caucasus in the first instance,
and their place there would be filled by Indian troops from Egypt.
It would take at least six weeks to get troops to Merv.
. The Chairman said that General Milne considered it necessary,
if we decided on withdrawal, to give a grant of money, arms, and
ammunition. He even went so far as to say he -would abandon
Krasnovodsk. Hitherto we had always thought we would have to
hold Krasnovodsk, although General Malleson in one of his
telegrams had said that, if strongly attacked from the east, the place
might fall.
The telegram under discussion did not definitely pronounce for
either of the two alternatives stated, but the Chairman read into it
that General Milne was in favour of withdrawal.
General Radcliffe said that he had discussed the matter with
the C.I.G.S., and, on the whole, his opinion was that the military
• position was so unfavourable that, unless India had strong grounds
for wishing the force to be retained with a view to the possibility of
an outbreak of Bolshevism, he was in favour of withdrawal to
Krasnovodsk and Meshed. The question of giving up Krasnovodsk
was one for the Navy. From a military point of view he would not
give it up in the first instance, although it was a future possibility.
The position had been very much altered, not only from the
military, but also from the economic point of view, by the capture
of Orenburg. The enemy now had through communication from
Moscow to the front. This had, of course, a direct bearing on the
question of reinforcements; and from the economic standpoint,
there was now no hope of any trade corning out that wa} T . There
was, consequently, no prospect of a stable Government being
created in the near future.
Such was the immediate position, and, taking a very long view,
there did not seem any reason for our staying. If we took into
consideration the strongest possible combination against us—a
combination of 1 Russians and Germans—we should, from a military
point of view, be in the worst possible position. We should be
defending our own front line, so to speak, in front of cur own
wire, and should be hampered by the length of our lines of
communication.
Lastly, the retention of the mission in Trans-Caspia might lead
to an embarrassing situation in the Caucasus. Should the time
come for our withdrawal from the Caucasus we might be hampered
by the necessity ol maintaining our line of communication to
Trans-Caspia.
With regard to the question of prestige, he thought we had to
stand our loss and come away.
In reply to a question by the Chairman as to the manner of our
withdrawal, he said that it would be a delicate operation. It would
be necessary to keep the railway open, and, in order to do this,
payments would have to be made to avoid strikes. The withdrawal
would have to be gradual in order to give time to the civil
population, and to our friends in Trans-Caspia, to secure their own
safety. Their way to safety would probably bo over the Caspian.
Ths Chairman said that he would be most sorry for the
1 urcomans. I hey had no capacity lor forming a Government or
of developing any organisation, but they were loyal people, and had
been our friends. He feared they would have a bad time.